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Abstract 
Anxiety and depression can be represented on a dimensional spectrum of negative affect, broadly 
termed psychological distress. Research has identified several factors that maintain negative 
emotion, but have neglected the possibility that individuals’ interpretations of moral issues in the 
larger macro-system affects their level of distress. Thus, the current study investigated the role of 
perceptions of moral transgressions, or cognitive interpretations of stimuli (“transgressions”) that 
violate beliefs about right and wrong, as a predictor of psychological distress. Furthermore, this 
study tested how perceptions of moral transgressions vary as a function of individuals’ own 
moral intuitions, or moral foundations. Participants (N = 418) completed a one-time online-
survey composed of two parts – correlational and experimental phases. In the correlational 
phase, participants rated their perception of moral transgressions (others-toward-others) in the 
socio-political climate over the past two weeks. The experimental phase examined momentary 
distress ratings elicited after random assignment to morally valanced news articles, compared to 
a control condition. Each portion investigated moral transgressions predicting distress while 
controlling for risk factors of distress. Moral foundations in domains of harm, fairness, in-group, 
authority, and purity were expected to moderate (amplify) this pathway. As hypothesized, 
moderated regression analysis and multi-level modeling (MLM) demonstrated that perceptions 
of moral transgressions uniquely predicted distress, above and beyond risk factors of distress. 
Moreover, in line with moderation hypotheses, high moral foundations amplified some effects 
(e.g., fairness PMT*MF; b = .23, p = .001). These findings elucidate the importance of 
conceptualizing distress through a comprehensive lens which incorporates clients’ moral systems 
and perceptions of events in the larger socio-political-cultural climate.  
Keywords: distress, moral transgressions, moral foundations, sociopolitical climate  
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Chapter I: Introduction and Literature Review 
Today, questions of morality are extremely salient in society (Haidt, 2013). Individuals 
are inundated with information about community and world events, policies, and sentiments that 
are morally valanced in nature, such as health-care reform, immigration, acts of social injustice, 
and conflicting beliefs about gun-control (Morgan & Shanahan, 2017). However, there is limited 
evidence of the psychological impact of perceiving moral events in the larger socio-political 
climate on emotional distress; the current study aims to elucidate this relationship.  
In order to understand the impact of moral experiences on emotional well-being, it is 
imperative to delineate what “distress” comprises. Anxiety and depression commonly co-occur 
and are among the most prevalent and impairing psychiatric symptoms (Almeida et al., 2012; 
Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005). Both contribute to negative outcomes, including 
elevated somatic symptoms, interpersonal difficulties, and maladaptive behaviors such as 
substance use, self-injury, and suicide (Beck, 2010; Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998; Newman, 
Llera, Erickson, Przeworski, & Castonguay, 2013). Although there are unique differences 
between anxiety and depressive disorders, research suggests that both share an underlying 
common distress factor, namely negative affectivity (Brown et al., 1998). Indeed, Brown and 
Barlow (2009) propose that anxiety and depression can be understood as emotional disorders 
represented on a dimensional spectrum of negative affect, broadly termed psychological distress 
in the present paper.  
Given the transdiagnostic nature of these conditions, researchers have sought to 
understand the mechanisms that contribute to psychological distress. To date, a wealth of 
research attests to factors that play a role in the development and pathogenesis of anxiety and 
depression, including cognitions related to perceived low control and reduced self-efficacy 
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(Gross & Levenson, 1997; Lynch, Robins, Morse, & Krause, 2001), affective models of trait 
neuroticism (Barlow, Sauer-Zavala, Carl, Bullis, & Ellard, 2014), behavioral avoidance 
strategies (Barlow, 2000), and low social support (Barlow, 1988). Although there is empirical 
support for the cognitive, affective, behavioral and interpersonal domains of anxiety and 
depression, there is limited research on the moral domain, including how individuals’ moral 
perceptions might uniquely contribute to psychological distress (Skitka, 2010). That is, research 
is necessary to explore individuals’ interpretations of moral issues, how they relate to their moral 
assumptions (i.e., moral foundations; Haidt & Graham, 2007), and their influence on 
psychological distress.  
Currently, issues of morality are increasingly prevalent in our culture, implying that the 
perceived social environment may directly impact our moral judgments and response styles 
(Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2013). Indeed, Bronfenbrenner’s (1977, 1995) bioecological model 
of development emphasized the strong influences of the cultural and societal environments 
(macro-system) on family, community, and individual systems. Although Bronfenbrenner 
proposed that the macro-system operated as a separate, distal entity, research suggests the macro-
level climate contributes substantially to individual well-being (Markus & Kityama, 2009; 
Vélez-Agosto, Soto-Crespo, Vizcarrondo-Oppenheimer, Vega-Molina, & García Coll, 2017). 
For example, many citizens view the socio-political climate in the United States as polarized, 
with over half of Americans reporting social divisiveness as a significant source of stress 
(American Psychological Association [APA], 2017). In this respect, macro-level stressors can 
have broad implications for psychological distress, especially when the stressors violate one’s 
morals (Lench et al., 2018).  
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Moreover, research indicates that perceptions of moral transgressions, defined in this 
study as cognitive interpretations of stimuli (“transgressions”) between people that violate one’s 
beliefs about right and wrong, may play a role in predicting psychological stress—specifically, 
depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress severity (Litz et al., 2009). However, most studies 
have historically focused on the psychological effects of combat-related moral transgressions in 
military populations, necessitating research on this phenomenon in civilians. That is, questions 
remain about individuals’ perceptions of moral transgressions in their day-to-day lives, 
especially those that emanate from the socio-political climate.  
The relationship between macro-level stressors and individual psychological distress 
further depends on differences in individuals’ moral intuitions and beliefs about standards of 
right and wrong (Haidt, 2001; Schwartz, Sagiv, & Boehnke, 2000). Research indicates that moral 
judgments are automatic, intuitive responses embedded in socio-cultural systems; moral 
reasoning, in turn, is a post-hoc process utilized to rationalize one’s “gut” reaction (i.e., moral 
intuition; Haidt, 2001). Toward this aim, social psychologists (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & 
Joseph, 2004) sought to investigate these differences in moral judgments, which lead to the 
development of moral foundations theory (MFT). MFT asserts the existence of five moral 
foundations on which individuals make moral judgments and which vary across cultures 
(Graham et al., 2011). These include (1) harm/care (e.g., hurting others and human suffering is 
wrong, whereas helping others is right), (2) fairness/reciprocity (e.g., respect for individual 
rights), (3) in-group/loyalty (e.g., patriotism, affiliation), (4) authority/respect (e.g., maintaining 
traditions), and (5) purity/sanctity (e.g., avoiding engagement in indecent or disgusting acts). It 
may be that individuals become most distressed by perceived moral transgressions when they 
violate their most salient moral foundations. Therefore, the present study seeks to understand the 
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moderating effects of moral foundations on the relationship between perceptions of moral 
transgressions on psychological distress; specific hypotheses will be subsequently explored.   
To date, there is only one study that has examined perceptions of moral issues on 
subjective well-being (SWB) in the current macro-system. Specifically, Lench et al. (2018) 
found exposure to socio-political media content that was inconsistent with individuals’ morals 
predicted lasting changes in subjective well-being (measured via general happiness and life 
satisfaction) up to six months after the 2016 Presidential election. Results also revealed a 
significant conditional effect of moral foundations and media exposure on SWB, such that 
participants who endorsed foundations of harm/care and fairness/reciprocity (i.e., those that 
identified as liberal, “Clinton supporters”) demonstrated a stronger relationship between election 
coverage and declining SWB than individuals identifying as conservative “Trump supporters,” 
who were found to place equal value on the five foundations (Lench et al., 2018).  
Although this longitudinal study elucidated the salience of moral foundations and media 
exposure on well-being, it did not control for other risk factors of psychological distress that may 
have explained or contributed to their results; it remains unknown whether perceived 
transgressions explain unique variance in psychological distress. Additionally, this study focused 
heavily on political affiliation (Trump vs. Clinton supporters), necessitating research that does 
not prime individuals based on their political sentiments. Given the possible salience of the 
social climate on individuals’ well-being, research is warranted to disentangle morally-valanced 
perceptions of transgressions [in society] from known mechanisms of anxiety and depression 
such as trait neuroticism, low perceived control, avoidance behaviors, and poor social support.    
The purpose of the current investigation is to better understand how perceptions of moral 
transgressions interact with individual values (i.e., moral foundations) to predict distress 
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symptoms in the current socio-political climate. That is, the present study aims to test whether 
moral transgressions will predict distress above and beyond well-established cognitive, affective, 
behavioral, and interpersonal factors, which would point to a novel possible contributor to 
mental health symptoms. The literature review that follows provides further background on 
distress, well-known psychological factors contributing to distress, moral transgressions, and 
moral foundations, before describing the study hypotheses and design. 
Psychological Distress 
 Common Distress Factor 
Depression and anxiety impact millions of individuals per year, causing distress and 
interference in a wide range of psychological, occupational, and social settings (Brown, 
Campbell, Lehman, Grisham, & Mancill, 2001; Newman et al., 2013). Major depressive disorder 
(MDD) is considered a disorder of dysregulated negative emotion (Brown et al., 2013; Forbes & 
Dahl, 2005), and is characterized by dysphoric affect and/or depressed mood, lack of interest or 
pleasure in previously enjoyed activities, changes in eating patterns, sleep disturbance, 
concentration difficulties, psychomotor abnormalities (i.e., slowed movement or agitation), 
excessive fatigue, heightened guilt, and recurrent thoughts of death or suicide. Five of these nine 
symptoms must be present for at least two weeks to constitute a major depressive episode 
(American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). The Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Administration (SAMHSA; 2017) approximates that 16.2 million adults, or 6.7% of the entire 
U.S. population, experienced at least one major depressive episode in the last year. To that end, 
the lifetime prevalence of any mood disorder, including unipolar and bipolar psychiatric 
conditions, is estimated to be 21.4% (Kessler et al., 2005). Additionally, depression symptoms 
exist as a dimensional syndrome outside of formal diagnosis and are characterized by a core of 
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negative affect shared in common with other mental health conditions such as anxiety, obsessive-
compulsive disorders, traumatic stress, somatization, and eating disorders (APA, 2013; Brown & 
Barlow, 2009). 
Similar to depression, anxiety disorders are typified by negative affect and poor emotion 
regulation (Brown et al., 1998). Approximately 19.1% of adults experience an anxiety disorder 
over a 12-month period, with a lifetime prevalence of 33.7% (i.e., over 110 million people; 
Bandelow & Michaelis, 2015). The most common anxiety disorders diagnosed in adult 
populations include generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), social anxiety disorder (SAD), panic 
disorder (PD), agoraphobia, and specific phobias. Anxiety symptoms can include apprehension, 
worry, and unpleasant physiological arousal; they often lead to disruptive behaviors (e.g., 
behavioral and cognitive avoidance, self-medicating strategies, social isolation, among other 
maladaptive responses; APA, 2013).  
Elucidating the nature and etiology of depression and anxiety requires acknowledging 
their shared features. Indeed, anxiety and depressive disorders have both been associated with 
high rates of chronic and severe impairment, elevated suicide risk, and lower quality of life, as 
well as similar treatment interventions and outcomes (Bronisch & Wittchen, 1994; Brown, 
Schulberg, Madonia, & Shear, 1996). Extant research has consistently demonstrated high 
comorbidity between anxiety and depressive disorders (Bandelow & Michaelis, 2015; Brown et 
al., 2001; Clark & Watson, 1991; Kessler et al., 2005). In a study of over 1,000 outpatient 
individuals diagnosed with anxiety and/or mood disorders, results revealed that 55% of 
individuals with a primary anxiety or depressive disorder also met criteria for one or more 
additional anxiety or mood conditions. This rate increased to 76% when lifetime prevalence of 
any psychiatric disorder was considered (Brown et al., 2001). According to the National 
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Comorbidity Survey Replication (Kessler et al., 2005), the correlation between 12-month 
prevalence of GAD and MDD was exceptionally high (r = .62). This research suggests the 
likelihood of a broader syndrome or vulnerability underlying these disorders. 
In addition to comorbidity of DSM-5 (APA, 2013) diagnostic categories, factor analyses 
of dimensional anxiety and depression symptoms reveal their common variance. In a community 
epidemiology sample utilizing clinical interviews and self-report measures of various mental 
health conditions, Kessler et al. (2005) found a two-factor solution including an internalizing 
factor comprised of all anxiety disorders and major depression, as well as an externalizing factor 
including impulse control and substance use disorders. Furthermore, the correlation between 12-
month prevalence of MDD and any anxiety disorder (GAD, panic disorder, agoraphobia, social 
anxiety disorder, separation anxiety disorder, specific phobia) ranged from .37 to .62 (Kessler et 
al., 2005). Similarly, in structural equation models of clinician-rated symptoms in a clinical 
sample, Brown and colleagues (1998) found support for a common distress or negative affect 
factor on which anxiety disorders (GAD, PD, OCD, and SAD) and depression loaded. This 
suggests that distress is a transdiagnostic symptom. These findings provide evidence for shared 
core emotional features of anxiety and depression (i.e., unifying factor of negative affect; 
Barlow, Allen, & Choate, 2004), necessitating a dimensional approach to understanding these 
internalizing disorders (Andrews, 1990; Brown & Barlow, 2009).  
Known Risk Factors of Psychological Distress 
Anxiety and depressive symptoms not only share a common core of distress, but also 
shared mechanisms thought to underscore these conditions. These factors encompass biological, 
psychological, and specific learning experiences that contribute to the development or 
maintenance of disorders of negative affect (Barlow, 2002; Clark & Watson, 1991). First, 
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temperament and personality traits such as neuroticism have genetic and neurobiological origins 
(Hettema, Neale, & Kendler, 2001). Neuroticism reflects chronic vulnerability to negative 
emotions (e.g., irritability, anger, sadness, anxiety; Costa & McCrae, 1992) and represents a 
major risk factor for anxiety and depressive disorders. Genetic heritability accounts for 40 to 
60% of the variance in trait expression (Bouchard & Loehlin, 2001; Kendler, Prescott, Myers, & 
Neale, 2003). Neurobiological mechanisms further provide evidence for the maladaptive effects 
of neuroticism on anxiety and depression, as extant research demonstrates heightened autonomic 
arousal (e.g., amygdala reactivity, activation of the hypothalamic pituitary adrenal axis) and poor 
inhibitory control in individuals with neurotic traits (Brown & Barlow, 2009; Keightley et al., 
2003; Stein, Simmons, Feinstein, & Paulus, 2007; Westlye, Bjornebekk, Grydeland, Fjell, & 
Walhovd, 2011). As posited earlier, in order for symptoms of anxiety or depression to develop, 
genetics and neurobiological systems must interact with other cognitive, behavioral, and 
environmental risk factors. Thus, I turn my discussion to these specific considerations.  
Second, cognitive perceptions of uncontrollability are thought to drive distress in both 
anxiety and depressive disorders. That is, when individuals believe they cannot predict and 
control outcomes of events, the future, or potential threats, they experience a sense of 
helplessness that perpetuates anxiety or depression (Barlow, 2000). This lack of cognitive control 
(Rotter, 1966) over circumstances leads to increased psychological distress (Barlow, 2002). For 
instance, a meta-analysis of over 8,200 individuals revealed that perceptions of unpredictable and 
uncontrollable events predicted elevated and less variable levels of daily secretion of cortisol, a 
biomarker for depressive and anxiety disorders (Miller, Chen, & Zhou, 2007). Furthermore, 
endorsing a low internal locus of control (i.e., believing one has little agency over their life) is 
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associated with development of disorders of negative affect, specifically anxiety (GAD, SAD, 
PD) and depression (Gallager, Bentley, & Barlow, 2014; Wong & Anitescu, 2017).   
Third, in response to perceived low control and accompanying negative affect, many 
individuals utilize maladaptive strategies to cope with their distress, specifically avoidance 
(Barlow, 2000). For example, if an individual is worried about presenting in front of a group, he 
or she may escape this anxiety-inducing situation by not attending work. This temporarily 
decreases the negative affect, negatively reinforcing avoidance and ultimately contributing to 
distress over time because the individual never learns she/he/they can handle the challenge. A 
myriad of strategies serves the function of short-term escape of distress, including behavioral, 
interoceptive, situational, cognitive and affective forms of avoidance (see Brown & Barlow, 
2009 for review). These maladaptive strategies can ultimately contribute to poor social 
relationships and interpersonal functioning (Brown, 2000; Beck, 2010).  
Lastly, abundant research suggests interpersonal problems are a core feature of anxiety 
and depression, as they are usually characterized by dysfunctional beliefs about social threats and 
fear of rejection (Heerey & Kring, 2007), poor perceived quality of social supports (Hefner & 
Eisenberg, 2009), and maladaptive social behaviors (e.g., interpersonal conflict, problematic 
interpersonal goals; Erickson et al., 2017; Starr & Davila, 2008). Specifically, low perceptions of 
available social support may represent a transdiagnostic factor that perpetuates both anxiety and 
depression (Wang, Cai, Quin, & Pang, 2014). Indeed, limited family and peer social support has 
been linked to depression and anxiety (Lewinsohn, Gotlin, & Seeley, 1997), and relationship 
satisfaction tends to be poor for individuals with these psychiatric disorders (Whisman, Sheldon, 
& Goering, 2000).  
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In summary, there is substantial evidence that anxiety and depression symptoms reflect a 
shared dimension of emotional distress, and that factors such as trait neuroticism, low perceived 
control, avoidance, and interpersonal difficulties (e.g., low social support) reflect shared risk 
factors. However, despite these well-known factors, there is a dearth of research on the relevance 
to the moral domain to psychological distress. Namely, I am interested in the unique 
contributions to emotion by the moral domain, and whether people’s perceptions of moral 
transgressions in the world predict distress above and beyond the common risk factors previously 
explored.  
The Moral Domain 
Defining Morality 
In the nineteenth century, Friedrich Nietzsche asserted that “there is no such thing 
as moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena” (Nietzche, 1886, p. 108). 
This evocative quote hints at the notion of individual differences in moral beliefs on individuals’ 
perceptions and responses to events. That is, when people are confronted with situations that they 
perceive as violations to their moral standards, varying cognitive and emotional responses may 
be activated. Pronounced differences of opinion on moral issues are, for instance, demonstrated 
through the dichotomous and often conflictual moral imperatives espoused by conservatives and 
their liberal counterparts (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). The field of moral psychology 
attempts to understand these competing moral concerns among individuals, groups, and societies, 
their impact on emotions, and how they affect decision-making (Graham et al., 2009; Skitka, 
2010).  
The moral domain has been studied for centuries, from the philosophers of ancient 
Greece to Immanuel Kant during the Enlightenment period, to the political and social scientists 
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of today (Graham et al., 2011). Morality, defined broadly as core beliefs about right versus 
wrong (i.e., rules or codes of conduct), has predominantly focused on protecting individuals and 
reduction of harm (Graham et al., 2009; Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2014). A well-cited definition of 
morality, posited by Turiel (1983, p. 3), encompasses “prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, 
and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other.” Further, the moral domain is 
conceptualized as distinct from personal and conventional norms of conduct. This predominant 
view asserts that people act and respond differently to situations based on their personal 
preferences (e.g., interests such as hairstyle), cultural standards (e.g., driving on the opposite side 
of the road in Europe, following rules or laws), and moral imperatives (e.g., reduce harm toward 
others; Turiel, 1983). Whereas individuals’ preferences and cultural norms can be variable and 
situation-specific, they often interpret their moral beliefs as universal, temporally stable, rigid, 
and impervious to contradictory evidence (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005).  Therefore, 
perceived transgressions against one’s morality are likely to cause distress. Next, prior to 
considering how moral transgressions relate to distress, I provide a brief overview of rationalist 
versus more recent intuitionist theories of moral judgments, which emphasize cognitive versus 
emotional processes, respectively.  
Rationalist and Intuitionist Theories of Morality 
Lawrence Kohlberg’s (1969, 1971) model of morality development has exerted great 
influence on theories of moral decision making. He proposed that children develop morals 
through cognitive reasoning and social learning, and that these beliefs become integrated and 
more mature over time. Through this process, children and adolescents progress through six 
stages of moral development, ranging from pre-conventional reasoning (e.g., emphasis on reward 
and punishment, obedience) to post-conventional internalization of moral beliefs (e.g., oriented 
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toward human rights, values, and individual freedom). This model, in addition to Gilligan’s 
(1982) assertion that care forms the bases for morality, are similar to Turiel’s (1983) sentiments, 
asserting that justice, individual rights, and human welfare are the most principled moral 
concerns. Further, they develop through rational, deliberate, top-down reasoning that supposedly 
leads to an informed moral sentiment (Bauman & Skitka, 2009).  
However, criticism to this approach stems from observations that people are able to 
intuitively recognize a moral issue when they encounter one, without complex, prior moral 
reasoning (Gray et al., 2014; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). Moreover, they often experience a 
strong gut-level sense of conviction or “moral intuition” about right and wrong, without ability to 
rationally articulate the basis for their judgment—a process termed moral dumbfounding (Haidt, 
Bjorklund, & Murphy, 2000). For instance, Haidt et al. (2000) studied this construct by 
presenting participants with a harmless, yet morally relevant scenario involving two adult 
siblings who engage in consensual, protected sexual intercourse. They found that participants 
often responded strongly to this vignette, condemning it as immoral while unable to provide 
convincing reasons for their judgment. This lack of rational deduction underscores intuitive 
theories of morality, as they emphasize automatic, implicit emotional reactions (e.g., disgust, 
anger, shame, empathy) to moral stimuli without complex reasoning (Gray et al., 2014; Haidt, 
McCauley, & Rozin, 1997; Haidt, 2001, 2012). Moral dumbfounding theorists assert that limbic 
regions tied to emotion become activated in response to morally valanced situations, which may 
explain why people react viscerally before they can verbally reason (Haidt, 2001). In summary, 
these models portray the moral domain as important for understanding human experience, and 
also suggest relevance to emotional processes. However, they fail to address the impact of 
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morality on psychological health, whereas recent research on moral transgressions more directly 
examines such links.  
Perceived Moral Transgressions 
 When individuals perceive moral transgressions—violations of their deeply held moral 
beliefs—they exhibit unique cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses (Frankfurt & Frazier, 
2016; Litz et al., 2009). Recent research on moral injury provides an example of how perceptions 
of moral transgressions might predict unique variance in distress, emphasizing the incongruence 
and dissonance that arises from having one’s fundamental moral beliefs and assumptions 
violated. Litz and colleagues (2009) described moral injury as “perpetuating, failing to prevent, 
bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and 
expectations” (p. 700), typically within the context of combat trauma.  
 Combat experiences may force military service members to face unimaginable moral 
and ethical conflicts, which may have lasting effects on physiological and psychological 
functioning (Maguen & Litz, 2012). Within the past several decades, research on psychological 
correlates of combat exposure has predominately focused on the development and etiology of 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). However, combat trauma can also evoke intense shame 
and guilt-based disturbances as soldiers are exposed to acts of extreme violence and destruction 
(Drescher et al., 2011; Litz et al., 2009). These wartime transgressions may violate deeply 
engrained beliefs and lead to the development of moral injury. Moral injury extends beyond the 
constellation of PTSD symptoms, and includes the dimensions of internal moral conflict, 
increased guilt and shame, demoralization, self-handicapping, and elevated incidents of self-
injury, exclusively studied within military populations.  
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The phenomenon of moral injury was originally examined through coding and 
identification of central themes in military service members’ narratives. The primary dimensions 
of moral injury included betrayal by others or self, exposure to disproportionate violence (e.g., 
acts of revenge) or killing of civilians, and within-rank violence (e.g., “friendly-fire” incident, 
military sexual trauma; Drescher et al., 2011). In addition to qualitative analyses, self-report 
measures of moral injury (Currier, Holland, Drescher, & Foy, 2015a; Nash et al., 2013) have 
delineated perceived violations across several domains, including (1) transgressions committed 
by self to others, (2) transgressions by others [toward self], and (3) observed transgressions 
between people (other-to-other). For example, observing military members harming non-
combatants (e.g., violent acts, sexual assault) or betraying their unit reportedly elicited moral 
injury and elevated distress. Furthermore, transgressions by self or others (e.g., comrades killing 
civilians) was strongly correlated with post-traumatic stress, pessimism, and hopelessness (Bryan 
et al., 2016). Of note, several studies have shown that moral injury is associated with worse 
physical health outcomes and higher depression, anxiety, and suicidal ideation, even when 
controlling for PTSD symptom severity (Bryan, Bryan, Morrow, Etienne, & Ray-Sannerud, 
2014; Nash et al., 2010; Nash et al., 2013; Yan, 2016). In addition, Hoffman and colleagues 
studied appraisals of morally injurious experiences in a sample of refugees and found that 
perceptions of moral violations (by self and toward others) predicted higher anger and depression 
(Hoffman, Liddell, Bryant, & Nickerson, 2018).  
The literature on moral injury clearly exemplifies the connection between morality and 
clinical phenomena (Litz et al., 2009). However, it is perplexing that there is limited research on 
moral transgressions, and subsequent psychological distress, in civilian populations. Although 
there are moral issues in society that are not as obviously harm-based as those depicted in war 
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(Graham et al., 2011; Gray et al., 2014), this does not negate their relevance and impact on 
psychological well-being. For instance, individuals may still be sensitive to perceived violations 
of less extreme harm (e.g., distress upon exposure to news articles about social rudeness, 
political turmoil, wage gaps related to gender).  Indeed, Schwartz et al. (2000) assert that 
individuals experience two types of worry as a function of their values, including micro and 
macro-level worries. Micro-worries are self-oriented (Schwartz, 1992) whereas macro-worries 
are external to the individual and include concerns about society and the larger world (e.g., issues 
related to the economy, health, social justice). Macro-level distress is usually based on other-
focused interests and concern for human welfare (Schwartz et al., 2000); this distress is further 
derived from exposure to changing social, political, and cultural environments.  
Major national and world events (i.e., the macro-system) can have an impact on 
psychological functioning (Lucas, Clark, Georgellis, & Diener, 2004). Lench and colleagues 
(2018) found support for macro-level stressors affecting civilians’ quality of life, as they 
examined predictors of subjective-well-being over time in response to the 2016 Presidential 
election between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. They found that morally-valenced political 
values, in conjunction with media exposure that was inconsistent with these beliefs, predicted 
lasting negative effects (up to six months post-election) in subjective well-being (SWB). 
However, their study was limited to SWB as assessed by indicators of life satisfaction and 
general happiness, rather than clinical screening assessments of psychological distress (Lench et 
al., 2018). Moreover, with the exception of this study, there is a dearth of research on 
individuals’ perceptions of moral issues in the current socio-political climate, specifically in the 
United States. This necessitates research that examines people’s perceptions of events in the 
larger macro-system that induce morally relevant distress (e.g., policies that restrict human rights 
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or actions that disrespect authority). As I am interested in transgressions related to the macro-
system (i.e., socio-political climate), this study will focus exclusively on the predictive nature of 
moral transgressions between people (others-to-others) on psychological distress, accounting for 
trauma exposure history. Specifically, I expect that perceptions of moral transgressions will 
positively predict psychological distress above and beyond known risk factors. In other words, 
the more someone perceives something as a moral transgression, the higher their level of 
psychological distress. 
Furthermore, research is warranted to better understand how these perceptions of moral 
transgressions vary as a function of individuals’ own moral intuitions; people may be more 
distressed when perceived transgressions violate the moral standards they hold most dear. As 
briefly illustrated next, moral foundations theory provides a framework (i.e., value-laden bases 
on which individuals judge an issue as moral or not) consisting of five distinct foundations that 
may be relevant to understanding how beliefs interact with moral transgressions to predict 
psychological distress, and how this varies among people (Lench et al., 2018). 
The Moderating Role of Moral Foundations 
As illustrated, morality is a complex construct, historically (Turiel, 1983) defined as 
standards of right and wrong related to individuals’ welfare, reduction of harm, and fairness.  
Research has suggested moral universals in dimensions of limiting harm (i.e., care for others) 
and upholding fairness (Graham et al., 2009; Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2014). The former domain 
is composed of values that emphasize benevolence, compassion, and reduction of human 
suffering, whereas the fairness dimension focuses on equality, human rights, and justice. 
Although these moral imperatives are shared to varying extents across cultures, Graham et al. 
(2011) argued that they are strongly entrenched in Western, individualistic assumptions.  
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Consequently, research has demonstrated the limitations of defining moral transgressions 
as strictly relevant to only the domains of harm and fairness (Haidt, 2001; Skitka, 2010; Bauman 
& Skitka, 2009). For example, some people might perceive an African American football player 
kneeling during the national anthem as an immoral act that violates their deeply held values of 
nationalism, while others could view this action as consistent with their values of fairness (Haidt, 
2012). Research on people of lower socio-economic status in Brazil and the United States (Haidt 
et al., 1993), civilians in India (Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987), and U.S. residing 
individuals who identify as conservative (Graham et al., 2009) revealed morally-valenced 
concerns beyond harm and fairness. Other concerns include purity (keeping the spiritual 
separated from the physical, e.g., sexual chastity, adhering to religious doctrine, avoiding acts 
considered as ‘disgusting’), hierarchical roles in families and societies, and loyalty to one’s 
group. Indeed, some moral concerns reference values of duty, obedience, tradition, respect, 
and/or purity of mind and soul. Thereby, Graham et al. (2011, p. 367) assert, “scales that attempt 
to measure morality by assessing attitudes of harm and fairness are thus leaving out much of 
what people – even Westerners – explicitly and spontaneously include in their descriptions of the 
moral domain.” This lack of an adequate, systemic model of morality led to the development of 
moral foundations theory (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007).  
Moral foundations theory (MFT) provides a framework for understanding how moral 
concerns (i.e., perceptions and decision making) differ between people and groups. Towards this 
aim, researchers utilized an anthropologic, cross-cultural approach to understand similarities and 
differences among individuals, groups, and societies’ moral concerns. Graham et al. (2009) 
identified five distinct foundations that they expected most cultures to espouse in varying 
degrees, which include dimensions of (1) harm/care, (2) fairness/reciprocity, (3) in-
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group/loyalty, (4) authority/respect, and (5) purity/sanctity. As demonstrated previously, harm 
and fairness apply to ethics of autonomy, care, and equality, whereas the in-group and authority 
domains stress obligation and duty to one’s community, leader, and/or country. The foundation 
of purity adheres to ethics around divinity (i.e., keeping the sacred separate from the mundane), 
cleanliness, and chastity (Graham et al., 2011; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 
Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). To parallel these domains, the perceived moral 
transgressions (i.e., focal predictor) examined in this study include those related to violations of 
harm (e.g., someone causing harm or injury to another), fairness (e.g., unfair treatment and 
services of people of color; denial of rights), in-group (e.g., betrayal to one’s country or 
community), authority (e.g., disrespecting traditions, authority figures), and purity (e.g., 
engaging in unnatural or ‘disgusting’ acts). I expect perceived moral transgressions in the current 
socio-political climate will be moderated by individuals’ moral foundations (i.e., moral values of 
harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity).  
Conservative and Liberal Approaches to Morality  
MFT asserts that individuals and cultures vary in how much value they place on these 
specific moral domains. Consequently, MFT suggests that these discrepancies in prioritization of 
moral foundations may explain conflicts in ideologies and differing views of morally-relevant 
issues. Thereby, MFT theory may shed light on “culture wars” such as those among political 
liberals and conservatives in America (Haidt & Graham, 2007, p. 368).  
Through investigating the differences between moral foundations held by liberals and 
conservatives, two trends unfolded (Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2012). Specifically, individuals 
who endorsed politically liberal views on moral issues tended to prioritize foundations of harm 
and fairness, the so-called “individualizing” foundations that emphasize protection of individuals 
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from unfair treatment and harm. Conversely, the moral dimensions of in-group loyalty, authority, 
and purity have been conceptualized as “binding” foundations, as they promote coherence in a 
larger group (by focusing on group loyalty, respect to authority, obedience, and sanctity), 
consistent with conservative ideologies. Several studies (Graham et al., 2009, 2011; Haidt, 2012; 
Lench et al., 2018) have investigated the differences between liberal versus conservative 
endorsements of these moral foundations and found that liberals generally value harm and 
fairness-related issues as more salient than in-group, authority, and purity foundations, whereas 
conservatives generally endorse all five foundations equally (Haidt & Graham, 2007).  
These findings provide insight into the political divisiveness in the United States, and 
how individuals’ perceptions of morally relevant issues (e.g., abortion and healthcare rights, 
racism and police brutality, sexual harassment, among other current events) depends upon their 
moral foundations and contributes to one’s subsequent emotional responses (and perhaps 
psychological distress). However, no studies have directly examined how the relevance of moral 
transgressions to psychological distress might vary as a function of one’s moral foundations. For 
instance, those who most strongly value authority/respect and purity/sanctity might endorse 
strongest distress in response to transgressions in those domains.  
Current Study 
Theorizing that perceptions of moral issues influence emotional distress, the current study 
aims to examine the unique contribution of perceived moral transgressions to psychological 
distress, above and beyond known mechanisms of distress. Furthermore, this research aims to 
address the gaps within the moral injury (i.e., termed perceptions of moral transgressions [PMT] 
in this study) and moral foundations literature by examining processes relevant to these 
constructs in a civilian population. Moral foundations are expected to moderate the relationship 
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between perceptions of moral transgressions in society and their effects on psychological 
distress.  
In a large sample of U.S. adults, this study consists of two parts utilizing the same 
participant sample. Part I was a correlational examination of the extent to which between-person 
variability in PMT in the socio-political climate over the past two weeks predicted distress above 
and beyond known risk factors (and depended on moral foundations), whereas Part II 
experimentally investigated within-person variability in the moment (e.g., reported distress 
immediately after exposure to a moral transgression vignette) and how these perceived 
transgressions interacted with individuals’ moral foundations. Parts I and II had parallel 
hypotheses; however, for ease of interpretation, they are delineated below for both portions of 
the study (correlational and experimental). For Part I, I hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis 1a. Given the possibility that links between PMT and distress apply not just 
to veterans (Litz et al., 2009) but also more broadly (Lench et al., 2018), I expect that perceptions 
of moral transgressions will positively predict psychological distress, operationalized as a 
composite of anxiety and depression symptoms. Specifically, I expect a main effect of each 
perceived moral transgression (PMT) on distress, such that (1) higher levels of PMT in the 
domain of harm/care will predict higher distress, (2) higher levels of PMT in the domain of 
fairness/reciprocity will predict higher distress, (3) higher levels of PMT in the domain of in-
group/loyalty will predict higher distress, (4) higher levels of PMT in the domain of 
authority/respect will predict higher distress, (5) higher levels of PMT in the domain of 
purity/sanctity will predict higher distress, and (6) higher levels of total (a composite of all five 
perceived moral transgressions) will predict higher distress. In addition, as an exploratory 
analysis, I planned to simultaneously enter all predictors in one model to examine which PMTs 
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remain significant when accounting for all other PMTs in the analysis (I had no hypotheses about 
which effects would remain significant). 
Hypothesis 2a. In line with the previous hypothesis, I expect that perceptions of moral 
transgressions (individual PMT types as well as a composite of all PMT) will positively predict 
psychological distress (six tests), even when controlling for known risk factors of distress, 
including neuroticism, perceived control, avoidance behaviors, social support, and history of 
trauma exposure (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Proposed model diagram of the effect of perceptions of moral transgressions 
(individually, as well as a composite of all PMT) on psychological distress, controlling for 
known risk factors of distress.   
 
Hypothesis 3a. Given the role of moral experiences, specifically perceived 
transgressions, on the development of psychiatric distress (Bryan et al., 2016; Currier, Holland, 
& Mallot, 2014; Ferrajao & Oliveira, 2016), and the existence of multiple moral foundations 
(i.e., conceptualized as five value systems; Graham et al., 2011), I hypothesize that the 
relationship between PMT and psychological distress will be moderated by moral foundations. 
Specifically, I expect a synergistic effect such that each perceived moral transgression will 
interact with the corresponding moral foundation (e.g., PMT*MF for harm/care, 
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fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity) to predict distress. 
For instance, I expect that scoring higher on the moral foundation of fairness/reciprocity will 
amplify the extent to which PMT for fairness/reciprocity will predict distress. That is, I predict 
that the more someone values each moral foundation, the stronger the relationship will be 
between their PMT and reported distress. At high levels of moral foundations (e.g., high 
endorsement of purity/sanctity foundation), the relationship between PMT and distress will be 
strongly positive; conversely, at low levels (e.g., low endorsement of purity/sanctity foundation), 
the relationship between PMT and distress will diminish or be non-significant. I expect this 
interaction pattern for all five foundations (Figure 2) and predict this to be the case even when 
accounting known risk factors of distress, including neuroticism, perceived control, avoidance, 
social support, and trauma history.  
 
Figure 2. Hypothesized model diagram of the effect of perceptions of moral transgressions on 
psychological distress, moderated by moral foundations and controlling for known risk factors of 
distress. 
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Part II is a within-subjects experimental design in which each participant was exposed to 
a control condition vignette as well as two randomly assigned [real life] news article vignettes 
depicting various moral transgressions of harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, 
authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. For Part II, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 1b. In an experimental context, I expect that perceptions of moral 
transgressions (vignettes of harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, 
and purity/sanctity) will positively predict distress compared to a control condition – a neutral 
vignette. That is, I predict a main effect of each perceived moral transgression (harm/care, 
fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity) on distress relative 
to the control condition, such that participants will report higher distress related to each type of 
PMT compared to the control condition.    
Hypothesis 2b. I predict that perceptions of moral transgressions will positively predict 
distress compared to a control condition, even when accounting for known risk factors of 
distress, including neuroticism, perceived control, avoidance, social support, and trauma history 
(Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Proposed model diagram of the effect of perceptions of moral transgressions versus 
control condition on psychological distress, controlling for known risk factors of distress.  
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Hypothesis 3b. Given that perceptions of moral transgressions are associated with 
elevated distress (Drescher et al., 2011; Litz et al., 2009), as well as exposure to moral issues in 
the socio-political-cultural climate (Lench et al., 2018), I expect the relationship between PMT 
and psychological distress will be moderated by moral foundations. I expect each moral 
foundation will interact with the corresponding perceived moral transgression (e.g., perceived 
moral transgression of fairness/reciprocity will interact with the moral foundation of 
fairness/reciprocity) to positively predict distress compared to a control condition (i.e., within-
person variability). I expect this interaction pattern for all five foundations, such that exposure to 
moral transgressions (i.e., perceived violations to harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, in-
group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity) will interact with endorsement of those 
specific moral foundations to predict higher distress, compared to a control condition. In other 
words, the within-person difference between distress related to a moral transgressions vignette 
versus a control condition will be amplified by higher scores on the corresponding moral 
foundation. I hypothesize this will be the case even when accounting for known risk factors of 
distress (e.g., neuroticism, perceived control, avoidance, social support, and trauma history; see 
Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Hypothesized model diagram of the effect of perceptions of moral transgressions 
(versus control condition) on psychological distress moderated by moral foundations, controlling 
for known risk factors of distress.  
 
Thus, in the present study, I aim to extend the literature by suggesting that perceptions of 
moral violations uniquely influence psychological distress, depending on moral foundations. It is 
my hope that these results will (1) provide evidence that morality explains unique variance in 
psychological distress, and (2) provide proof-of-concept for the idea that moral transgressions 
may bear implications for how clinicians might understand the integral role and influence that 
moral issues in the larger macro-system have on emotion. In fact, this study was inspired, in part, 
by my clinical interactions with patients who presented with elevated distress about events 
involving perceived transgressions (other toward other) in the current socio-political climate, 
such as healthcare restrictions, social injustices, and gun violence. I distinctly recall one client 
tearfully stating, “The world is just getting worse and worse, and I don’t know what to do about 
it.” These profound experiences provide anecdotal evidence of the need to address individuals’ 
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morals and value systems in treatment, and how these perceptions contribute to their mental 
health. The present study aims to test these ideas empirically.  
Chapter 2: Method 
Sample and Participant Selection  
Participants.  The current study utilized a participant pool from an online cross-sectional 
investigation of perceived transgressions, moral foundations, and emotions. Participants included 
418 individuals (46.9% female, 52.4% male, 0.5% transgender, and 0.2% other) recruited 
through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). All participants were residents in the United States 
with access to a computer and offered $3.60 compensation. Time to complete the survey ranged 
from 10 to 101 minutes (M = 23.95; SD = 12.85).  Participants ranged in age from 18-76 years 
old (M = 36.01; SD = 11.04) and included majority (74.6% Caucasian/White) as well as minority 
individuals (10% African American/Black, 7.2% Asian/Asian American, 3.8% Hispanic or 
Latino/a, 2.6% Biracial, 0.7% American Indian or Alaska Native, 0.7% Other, and 0.2% Native 
Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander). Participants were primarily heterosexual (89.7%), and 
70.7% of the sample endorsed a history of exposure to trauma. The sample included 56% of 
individuals identifying as liberal (15.3% slightly liberal, 19.4% somewhat liberal, 21.3% 
strongly/extremely liberal), 24.4 % identifying as conservative (9.8% slightly conservative, 
10.3% somewhat conservative, 4.3% strongly/extremely conservative), and 19.6% of individuals 
identifying as moderate. In addition, participants reported their political affiliation, with 44.5% 
registered as Democrat, 26.8% Independent, 20.6% Republican, 4.8% Not Registered to vote, 
2.9% Other, and .05% Declined to answer. Prior to data collection, the study was approved by 
the SPU Institutional Review Board. 
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Procedure. Recruited participants signed up for this study through the MTurk service, 
operated by Amazon. Research on MTurk has demonstrated the utility of this platform for data 
collection (Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013). Specifically, researchers have found that MTurk 
participants consistently respond in similar ways to other populations, such as in-person lab 
participants (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013). The equivalent 
MTurk survey results illustrate the ecological validity of this platform. In addition, Coppock 
(2018) recently conducted 15 replication studies of previous MTurk survey experiments, 
utilizing both convenience and national probability samples. Results revealed statistically 
significant homogeneity between the original studies and replicated findings, providing further 
evidence of the effectiveness of MTurk for data collection (Coppock, 2018).   
MTurk researchers are considered “requesters” and participants, termed “workers,” are 
compensated for completion of “HITs” (human intelligence tasks) such as cross-sectional 
surveys. MTurk does not support longitudinal studies at this time. As I was interested in a large 
national sample, the eligibility requirements were minimal, including the ability to read English 
as well as have access to the internet via a computer or mobile phone.  
Eligible adults interested in participating were directed to an online consent form, 
followed by the entire online survey, including both Part I and Part II (all administered within the 
secure online survey platform, Qualtrics). They were notified that their participation was 
completely voluntary, and they were compensated through MTurk within 48 hours of completion 
of the survey. In addition, each participant was provided a randomized ID that is not associated 
with their MTurk account, in order to receive compensation.  
For this one-time 30-45 minute survey, participants were asked to answer an online 
questionnaire, created through Qualtrics and distributed through MTurk, which consists of two 
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parts in one study (correlational and experimental). The first portion of the study contained 
measures to assess moral foundations as well as baseline covariates of trait neuroticism, 
perceived control, social support, avoidance, and trauma exposure. In addition, participants were 
asked questions about their perceptions of moral transgressions over the past two weeks, with 
items assessing violations between people (i.e., transgressions committed by others toward 
others). Next, they completed measures of depression, stress, and anxiety, as well as past history 
of trauma exposure.   
After completing the aforementioned surveys, the same participants were exposed to an 
experimental manipulation in which they were randomly assigned to two of five moral 
transgression vignettes depicting foundations of harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, 
authority/respect, or purity/sanctity, as well as a control vignette (order counterbalanced). Each 
vignette was based on a slightly modified real-life news article depicting one of these five moral 
foundations. For example, the harm/care article describes a young black woman who was shot 
and killed in her car after cutting someone off while driving on the freeway.  
Every participant received the same control condition, which depicted a relatively neutral 
news article (e.g., discussing increasing traffic in the nation) without any clear moral 
components, in order to control for the affective valence of stimuli (given the negative valence of 
the transgression vignettes). Each participant completed brief measures of their current emotional 
states before and after the first vignette or control condition, then after the second vignette. They 
also completed manipulation check questions after each condition to ensure they were 
representative of the moral foundation intended. This survey took most participants between 30-
45 minutes and included approximately 250 items. It was also pilot tested by the investigators. 
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Sample Size, Power, and Precision 
Based upon existing literature linking moral transgressions to distress (Currier et al., 
2014), I expected a medium effect size of .15 for the paths between PMT, moral foundations, and 
psychological distress. For the correlational portion of the study, I expected to recruit at least 166 
participants, assuming a total of 6 predictors for the main effects and 8 predictors for the 
moderation analyses (PMT, moral foundations, PMT x moral foundations, and covariates of trait 
neuroticism, locus of control, avoidance, social support, and trauma exposure) in hierarchical 
regression, with α = 0.05, and power of .95. My sample size is sufficient (N = 418).  
For Part II (experimental), according to Aguinas, Beaty, Boik, and Pierce (2005), to test 
moderated multiple regression with a continuous moderator and categorical predictor 
(transgressions versus control group), such an effect would achieve statistical power above .99 
with an N of 188. My sample size consists of 418 participants.  
Measures 
Demographic variables. Demographic variables collected included age, gender, sexual 
orientation, race/ethnicity, and political affiliation. 
Correlational measures (Part I). 
Psychological distress. Distress symptoms were measured using the shortened version of 
the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). The DASS 
is a 21-item self-report measure designed to assess emotional symptoms over a one-week period. 
It is a widely used dimensional inventory of negative affect (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). Each 
subscale contains seven items assessing depression (e.g., “I couldn’t seem to experience any 
positive feeling at all”), anxiety (“I was worried about situations in which I might panic and 
make a fool of myself”), and non-specific physiological experiences of stress (“I found it 
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difficult to relax”). Each statement corresponds to a rating based on a 4-point Likert scale 
ranging from 0 (did not apply to me at all) to 3 (applied to me very much or most of the time). 
Sum scores are computed by adding the scores on items within each subscale and multiplying 
them by two, in order to compare the subscales with the original 42-item DASS (Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995). Scores on the subscales of the DASS-21 range from 0 to 42, with higher scores 
indicating more psychological distress; scores above 10 for depression, 8 for anxiety, and 15 for 
stress suggest risk for clinically significant symptomology (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). The 
DASS-21 has displayed acceptable psychometric properties across multiple studies, including 
good estimates of internal consistency (α = .87) in both clinical and non-clinical populations 
(Henry & Crawford, 2005; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). In addition, the DASS-21 
demonstrated concurrent validity via moderate to high correlations with measures of clinical 
depression and anxiety, such as the Beck Depression Inventory-II (r = .80; BDI-II; Beck, Steer, 
& Brown, 1996) and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (r = .69; BAI; Beck & Steer, 1990). Extant 
literature asserts that the average Cronbach’s α for the DASS-21 is ≥ .90 (Osman et al., 2012). 
Cronbach’s α for the present study was .97.   
Moral foundations. The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2009) is 
a 30-item measure developed to assess individual differences in how people use moral 
foundations in moral decision making. The MFQ measures the five moral foundations of 
harm/care (α = .69), fairness/reciprocity (α = .65), in-group/loyalty (α = .71), authority/respect (α 
= .74), and purity/sanctity (α = .84), and is separated into two 15-item sections, including moral 
relevance and judgment considerations (Graham et al., 2011). The first section asks participants 
to rate the extent to which the items are relevant to their moral decisions on a 6-point Likert scale 
ranging from 0 (not at all relevant) to 5 (extremely relevant). Examples items include “Whether 
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or not someone suffered emotionally” (assessing harm/care) and “Whether or not someone did 
something to betray his or her group” (assessing in-group/loyalty; Graham et al., 2009).  
The second section, assessing moral judgments, prompts participants to indicate how 
much they agree with the items on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). Items include “If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer’s 
orders, I would obey anyway because that is my duty” (assessing authority) and “People should 
not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed” (assessing purity; Graham et al., 
2009, 2011). Items are summed and averaged across both sections of the measure to create sub-
scale scores ranging from 0-30 for each foundation, with higher values indicating greater 
endorsement of each foundation. Higher order factor dimensions of individualizing (harm/care 
and fairness/reciprocity) and binding (in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity) 
foundations can also be computed. However, Graham and colleagues (2011) analyzed 
comparative model fit via confirmatory factor analyses and found that a five-factor solution 
provided the best model fit.  
The MFQ has showed acceptable psychometric properties, including adequate internal 
consistency (Graham et al., 2011), as well as satisfactory test-retest reliability (Graham et al., 
2011). Furthermore, the MFQ has demonstrated good convergent and discriminant validity 
across all five moral foundations. For example, the MFQ foundation of harm/care positively 
correlates with other measures of empathy (Empathy subscale from Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index; Davis, 1983), benevolence (Schwartz, 1992), and caring (Adapted Good-Self Assessment; 
Barriga, Morrison, Liau, & Gibbs, 2001). Conversely, the MFQ foundation of harm/care 
demonstrated low correlations (r = .04) with Schwartz’s Values Scale (1992) items of loyalty, 
national safety, and family security. In the present study, Cronbach’s α = .88. Individual moral 
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foundations demonstrated adequate internal consistency: harm/care (α = .72), fairness/reciprocity 
(α = .66), in-group/loyalty (α = .80), authority/respect (α = .82), and purity/sanctity (α = .90). 
Perceived moral transgressions. In order to assess the unique contribution of perceived 
transgressions witnessed/learned about in the past two weeks, we created items that parallel a 
pre-existing survey – the Moral Foundations Questionnaire previously discussed (Graham et al., 
2009). These items assessed perceived moral violations corresponding to the five domains of 
morality referenced by Graham and colleagues (2009). As no extant measure of perceived 
transgressions across these domains was available, we created items patterned after the MFQ, 
which has demonstrated robust psychometric properties (Graham et al., 2009, 2011). The 
Perceived Moral Transgressions (PMT) questionnaire prompts participants to “think about how 
you’ve perceived the actions of people toward one another (e.g., social media, family 
interactions, news, etc.) in the past 2 weeks.” Each statement corresponds with a rating of the 
extent to which the person endorses the frequency of these transgressions, on a 5-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (consistently/always). This questionnaire consists of 15 
scenarios (3 scenario items per domain) mapping onto the domains of harm/care (“To what 
extent have people been acting unkind and harsh toward one another?”), fairness/reciprocity 
(“To what extent have people participated in acts of injustice?”), in-group/loyalty (“To what 
extent have people not been faithful to the ideas this country stands for?”), authority/respect (“To 
what extent have people not shown respect for their leaders?”), and purity/sanctity (“To what 
extent have people violated what is sacred?”). Each subscale was computed by averaging scores 
within that particular moral dimension, and a total score was created for a composite of PMT. 
Internal consistency for total PMT was computed and the coefficient α = .93. In addition, each 
moral transgression demonstrated acceptable internal consistency: harm/care (α = .84), 
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fairness/reciprocity (α = .87), in-group/loyalty (α = .71), authority/respect (α = .76), and 
purity/sanctity (α = .77). 
The dimensionality of the 15 items from the PMT measure was analyzed using 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA). First, data screening of the initial (unrotated) solution was 
conducted to determine the suitability for analyses. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of 
sampling adequacy was .95, indicating that the patterns of correlations were relatively compact 
and factor analysis would likely yield distinct and reliable factors (Field, 2013). The Barlett’s 
Test of Sphericity was statistically significant, suggesting clusters of correlated variables. In my 
dataset, Χ2 (105) = 3571.47, p < .001. Four criteria were used to determine the number of factors 
to rotate, including a priori theory (e.g., MFQ literature), the scree test, the Eigenvalue-greater-
than-one criteria, and the interpretability of the factor solution. After the initial EFA, the scree 
test indicated the presence of two or three factors. The Eigenvalue-greater-than-one criteria 
suggested two factors. Based on this information, two factors were rotated using the oblique, 
Direct Oblimin procedure. The rotated solution, as shown in Table 1, yielded two factors 
consistent with Graham and colleagues (2009) higher order factor structure: individualizing 
(harm, fairness dimensions) and binding (in-group, authority, purity) perceived moral 
transgressions. Individualizing items accounted for 50.15% of the item variance and binding 
items accounted for 11.98% of the variance. Several items loaded onto both factors, as depicted 
in Table 1, and thus item deletion may be appropriate. Further interpretation is warranted; 
however, a full factor structure analysis is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Thus, I will 
proceed with a five-factor structure, as hypothesized. 
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Table 1. 
Component Matrix of the Two-Factor Structure of Perceived Moral Transgressions Self-Developed 
Questionnaire 
Items Factor 
 1 
(Individualizing) 
2 
(Binding) 
 
Whether or not people have shown discrimination against 
others (Fair). 
.90  
Whether or not people have been treated unequally (Fair). .89  
Whether or not people have been behaving like they don’t 
care for those that are suffering or marginalized (Harm). 
.78  
Whether or not people have participated in acts of injustice 
(Fair). 
.76  
Whether or not people’s actions have been causing feelings 
of pain to others (Harm). 
.74  
Whether or not people have been acting unkind and harsh 
toward one another (Harm). 
.72  
Whether or not people have engaged in dirty deeds 
(Purity). 
.48 .35 
Whether or not people have made extremely crude or filthy 
comments (Purity).  
.41 .43 
Whether or not people have not been faithful to the idea of 
what this country stands for (In-group).  
.33 .42 
Whether or not people have not honored the flag as a 
symbol of America (In-group). 
 .84 
Whether or not people have shown respect to their leaders 
(Authority).  
 .69 
Whether or not people have promoted anarchy and unrest 
(Authority).  
 .68 
Whether or not people are lacking dedication to their own 
communities or families (In-group). 
 .62 
Whether or not people have violated what is sacred 
(Purity). 
 .59 
Whether or not people have rebelled against the established 
order (Authority).  
 .52 
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Trait neuroticism. Trait neuroticism was assessed using the Big-Five Mini-Markers 
Questionnaire (BFMMQ; Saucier, 1994). The BFMMQ is a 40-item measure of Big Five 
personality dimensions of openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and 
neuroticism (Goldberg, 1992). Instructions ask participants to consider the accuracy of trait-
adjectives based on a 9-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (extremely inaccurate) to 9 (extremely 
accurate). Nine of the 40 items are reverse coded. An aggregate score for each subscale is 
calculated by summing the items and dividing them by eight. Higher scores indicate stronger 
trait expression. The BFMMQ is considered a reliable and valid inventory of the Five-Factor 
Model of personality (Mullins-Sweatt, Jamerson, Samuel, Olson, & Widiger, 2006). In addition, 
the BFMMQ has demonstrated adequate internal consistency (openness, α = .76; 
conscientiousness, α = .70; extraversion, α = .58, agreeableness, α = .68, and neuroticism, α = 
.75; Bègue et al., 2015), as well as criterion and construct validity (Palmer & Loveland, 2004; 
Saucier, 1994). For this study, I used only the neuroticism scale, composed of eight items out of 
the 40-item measure, two of which were reverse coded. The coefficient α = .86. 
Perceived control. The Brief Locus of Control Scale (BLOC; Lumpkin, 1985) is a six-
item self-report measure developed as a brief screening assessment of individuals’ perceptions of 
control over their lives. This scale was developed in response to the need for a brief measure of 
locus of control (Lumpkin, 1985; Rotter, 1966). The BLOC Scale contains three items assessing 
internal control, such as “What happens to me is my own doing,” and three items assessing 
external dimensions of chance (reverse-scored), such as “Many times I feel I have little influence 
over the things that happen to me.” Each statement is measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). All items are combined to create a composite 
locus of control. Higher scores indicate greater internal locus of control. The BLOC Scale was 
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fielded on a large national sample (N = 4, 720), and demonstrated adequate internal consistency 
( = .68) and convergent validity with correlates of life satisfaction and coping (Lumpkin, 1985, 
1988). In the present study, coefficient α = .71. 
Avoidance. Approach versus avoidance tendencies were assessed using the Brief 
Approach/Avoidance Coping Questionnaire (BACQ; Finset, Steine, Haugli, Steen, & Laerum, 
2002). The BACQ is a 12-item self-report inventory that assesses coping styles in response to 
stressful situations. Participants are asked to indicate how much they agree with items on a 5-
point Likert scale with anchors from 1 (disagree completely) to 5 (agree completely). Items 
include “I like to talk with a few chosen people when things get too much for me” and “I make 
an active effort to find a solution to my problems,” assessing approach-oriented coping, as well 
as “I bury myself at work to keep my problems at a distance,” or “I withdraw from people when 
things get difficult,” measuring cognitive (diversion) and behavioral (withdrawal) avoidance. 
One item, “physical exercise is important to me,” was omitted due to low factor loadings and 
irrelevance to this study. Approach items are reverse scored (e.g., “I say so if angry or sad”) to 
create a sum of avoidance, with higher scores indicating greater avoidance.  
The BACQ was fielded on a clinical sample (N = 299) in a primary care setting and 
yielded satisfactory internal consistency ( = .68). It has also demonstrated concurrent validity 
with COPE (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989) sub-scales of seeking emotional support, 
active coping, positive reinterpretation of stressors, and behavioral as well as mental 
disengagement (all significant at p < .001). In this study, the coefficient α = .74. 
Social support. The Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support (MSPSS; 
Zimet, Dahlem, Zimet, & Farley, 1988) is a 12-item measure developed to assess perceived 
social support in three domains of family, friends, and significant others. The MSPSS utilizes a 
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7-point Likert scale anchored from 1 (very strongly disagree) to 7 (very strongly agree). Each 
subscale includes four items, such as “My family really tries to help me,” “I can count on my 
friends when things go wrong,” and “There is a special person who is around when I am in 
need.” The higher the total score, the more someone perceives social support in their lives. The 
MSPSS has demonstrated acceptable reliability and validity, with an average alpha value of .92 
(López-Ramos, Fernández-Muñoz, Navarro-Pardo, & Murphy, 2017; Zimet et al., 1988). The 
MSPSS has been validated cross-culturally and across different age groups, including geriatric 
populations (López-Ramos et al., 2017). The MSPSS has also demonstrated an inverse 
relationship with depression scores, providing further evidence of its’ construct validity (Zimet et 
al., 1988; Zimet, Powell, Farly, Werkman, & Berkoff, 1990). In the current study, the coefficient 
α = .95. 
Trauma exposure. In order to control for history of trauma (i.e., past stressful 
experiences that may involve moral transgressions), participants completed the Brief Trauma 
Questionnaire (BTQ; Schurr, Vielhaur, Weathers, & Findler, 1999). The BTQ is a brief self-
report measure developed to assess trauma exposure consistent with Criterion A of PTSD (e.g., 
exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence; APA, 2013). The BTQ 
is comprised of 10 items assessing (1) exposure to the event, (2) fear that the individual’s life 
was in danger, (3) and serious injury. Participants are asked to answer yes or no to each item. 
Example items of common traumatic events include “Have you ever served in a war zone, or 
have you ever served in a noncombat job that exposed you to war-related casualties; for example, 
as a medic or on graves registration duty?” and “Has a close family member or friend died 
violently; for example, in a serious car crash, mugging, or attack?” If any of the 10 event items 
are endorsed (“yes = 1” or “no = 0”), it is likely that the participant meets criteria for trauma 
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exposure; additional measures are needed to assess for clinical symptoms of PTSD. Higher sum 
scores indicate more exposure to traumatic events. The BTQ has demonstrated adequate inter-
rater reliability (κ = .74 to 1.00) for all events except those that occurred to others, as well as 
criterion validity indicating strong associations between BTQ trauma exposure and PTSD 
symptom inventories (Lancester, Melka, & Rodriguez, 2009; Schurr, Spiro, Vielhauer, Findler, 
& Hamblen, 2002). The present study focused on history of trauma exposure, with the 
coefficient α = .68.    
Experimental task (Part II).  
Moral transgression vignettes. To experimentally manipulate perceptions of moral 
transgressions and examine subsequent effects on distress, participants were exposed to two of 
five vignettes depicting a specific moral violation, as well as one “control” vignette. These moral 
transgressions parallel the five moral foundations identified by Graham and colleagues (2009, 
2011), including (1) harm, (2) fairness, (3) in-group, (4) authority, and (5) purity. These 
scenarios were adapted from 2018 internet news articles, and equivalent in length and reading 
level. For example, one vignette depicts a group of African American youth being arrested for 
suspicion while waiting in a coffee shop, demonstrating a violation of fairness. In addition to 
exposure to one of these five manipulated transgressions, each participant read the same control 
vignette, which depicted a news-story about increasing traffic rates in the United States, in order 
to provide a comparison condition that involves negative valence and perceived uncontrollability 
without a clear moral transgression. The order of vignettes was randomized and counterbalanced. 
Distress ratings for experimental task. Before their first vignette, between vignettes, and 
after their final vignette (total of four times), participants were asked to rate their current 
emotional states on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). These 12 
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items assess affective reactions of anxiety (i.e., “nervous,” “on-edge”) dysphoria (i.e., “sad,” 
“hopeless”), anger (i.e., “resentful,” “annoyed”), and disgust (i.e., “grossed out,” “dirty”). Items 
were derived from the shortened Profile of Mood States inventory (POMS; Lorr & McNair, 
1971). In order to determine state subjective distress, I created a composite of the items by 
averaging the scores, which provides a more stable and robust index of psychological distress. 
The POMS short form has evidenced good internal consistency (i.e., α = .84; Gawrysiak et al., 
2016).  In the current study, the coefficient α = .94. 
Furthermore, this portion of the study includes manipulation checks to ensure that the 
transgressions depicted in the scenarios mapped onto their intended moral domains, such as 
harm/care (i.e., “To what extent did the news story make you think people are too unkind to each 
other?”), fairness/reciprocity (i.e., “To what extent did the news story make you think that our 
current world lacks fairness and justice?”), in-group/loyalty (“To what extent did the news story 
make you think people are not loyal and true to our country anymore?”), authority/respect (“To 
what extent did the news story make you think people lack respect for authority and/or their 
elders?”) and purity/sanctity (“To what extent did the news story make you think people act like 
nothing is sacred or pure anymore?”). Participants were asked to rate these perceptions on a 5-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely).  
Data Analytic Plan  
Correlational (Part I). After preliminary data screening for multivariate assumptions, I 
examined my hypotheses in the correlational portion of the study (perceptions of experiences in 
the past two weeks) via hierarchical linear regression using SPSS 26 software. That is, I tested 
the relationship between the predictor variable of perceptions of moral transgressions 
(transgressions of harm, fairness, in-group, authority, purity and a composite sum of all moral 
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transgressions) on psychological distress (i.e., main effects), subsequently also controlling for 
covariates of trait neuroticism, perceived control, avoidance, social support, and trauma history. I 
serially examined the main effects of each of the five types of moral transgressions 
(corresponding to the five domains of moral foundations) on distress. The covariates were 
entered into the first block, followed by perceptions of moral transgressions (individual PMT and 
a composite of all moral transgressions), in order to observe the unique incremental variance 
accounted for by the focal predictor.  I also examined a composite of all PMT on psychological 
distress, as well as conducted a simultaneous regression entry (to investigate which PMTs 
remained significant when all are input into the model), for a total of seven main effects for the 
correlational portion. This analysis tested the primary question of whether broad perceptions of 
others’ moral transgressions in one’s social world will account for unique variance in distress 
symptoms.  
I then tested the theorized moderation model using PROCESS macro for SPSS, Model 1 
(Hayes, 2013). Specifically, I tested whether higher levels of individual differences in each of the 
five moral foundations amplified the prediction of distress by each respective type of moral 
transgression. For significant interactions, I conducted follow-up tests to probe the interaction 
(e.g., simple slope analyses at high [1 SD above the sample mean] and low [1 SD below the 
mean] levels of the moderator, moral foundations). Bias-corrected bootstrapping was applied in 
order to test the significance of the conditional effects. All predictors were grand-mean centered. 
Experimental (Part II). For the experimental task (i.e., part two), I reorganized the data 
for multi-level modeling (MLM). I chose to use this approach because the experimental design 
(within-person repeated measures) violated the assumption of independent observations which 
ordinary least squares regression (OLS) necessitates. Conversely, MLM circumvents the 
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assumption of independent errors by nesting repeated measures, or Level 1 variables, within 
participants (Level 2). I calculated restricted maximum likelihood (REML) parameter estimates 
(Heck, Thomas, & Tabata, 2010). Finally, I grand-mean centered the moral foundations (MFQ) 
variable. 
After screening for multivariate assumptions, I examined five main effects of each moral 
transgression (mapping onto domains of harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, 
authority/respect, and purity/sanctity) versus control condition on distress (comparing each 
transgression to the control condition, one at a time), while accounting for covariates of trait 
neuroticism, perceived control, avoidance, social support, and trauma history. This analysis 
tested for the causal influence of moral transgressions on distress in the moment, controlling for 
risk factors of distress.  
Finally, parallel to the correlational portion of the study, I tested whether each of the five 
moral foundations dimensions moderated the effects of moral transgression(s) versus the control 
condition (within each respective domain), controlling for covariates of trait neuroticism, 
perceived control, avoidance, social support, and trauma history. I analyzed the experimental 
data (main effects and conditional effects) through multi-level modeling (MLM), so that each 
participant had three different data points (control plus two randomly assigned vignettes) nested 
within the participant (i.e., MIXED command function on SPSS). This allowed me to test the 
experimental versus control conditions as a within-person effect.  
Chapter 3: Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Preliminary data pre-screening evaluated assumptions of normality (e.g., calculating skew 
and kurtosis) and reviewed the data for outliers. The univariate skew was within normal limits, 
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ranging from -.99 to 1.09; kurtosis ranged from -1.01 to 1.12 across major variables. In addition, 
the scatterplots indicated no evidence of nonlinear relationships. Variable means, standard 
deviations, and reliability estimates are represented in Table 2.   
Table 2.  
Means and Standard Deviations, and Reliability  
Variable Range M SD α 
 Min Max    
DASS Total  0 120.00 28.38 29.42 .97 
PMT Total 15.00 75.00 47.78 12.36 .93 
PMT Harm 3.00 15.00 10.50 2.98 .84 
PMT Fairness 3.00 15.00 10.56 3.09 .87 
PMT In-group 3.00 15.00 8.56 2.83 .70 
PMT Authority 3.00 15.00 8.90 2.86 .76 
PMT Purity 3.00 15.00 9.22 3.01 .77 
MFQ Total 44.00 146.00 87.28 20.27 .88 
MFQ Harm 7.00 30.00 22.10 4.87 .72 
MFQ Fairness 7.00 30.00 22.05 4.45 .66 
MFQ In-group 0 30.00 13.62 6.00 .80 
MFQ Authority 0 30.00 15.77 6.29 .82 
MFQ Purity 0 30.00 13.76 8.40 .91 
COV Neuroticism 8.00 69.00 31.35 13.13 .68 
COV Control 9.00 30.00 20.16 3.91 .71 
COV Avoidance 11.00 50.00 28.81 6.68 .74 
COV Social Support 12.00 84.00 64.64 15.39 .95 
COV Trauma Exp. 0 10.00 2.02 1.99 .68 
Note. DASS = Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales (DASS-21); PMT = Perceived Moral 
Transgression; MFQ = Moral Foundations Questionnaire; COV = Covariates 
 
To ensure that conditions manipulated the intended perceived moral transgressions, we 
examined the manipulation check items. Multilevel models testing within-person comparisons of 
each experimental condition versus the control condition showed significant effects of the harm 
condition on perceived harm transgressions (B = 1.81, SE = .12, p <.001), the fairness condition 
on perceived lack of fairness (B = 1.56, SE = .13, p <.001), the in-group condition on perceived 
disloyalty (B = .57, SE = .10, p <.001), the authority condition on perceived transgressions 
against authority (B = 1.46, SE = .12, p <.001), and the purity condition on transgressions against 
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purity (B = 1.20, SE = .13, p <.001). In addition, although conditions tended to significantly 
predict effects on all perceived transgressions, they had the largest effect on their respective type 
of transgression, with one exception: the in-group/loyalty condition also had a strong effect on 
the purity transgression (B = .80, SE = .10, p <.001). Thus, results suggested that the 
manipulations were perceived as transgressions broadly (consistent with past research showing 
that transgressions tend to impact multiple moral domains; Gray et al., 2014), but generally 
elicited their respective transgression most strongly.  
Prior to analyzing missingness, the principal investigator noticed a large discrepancy in 
the amount of time participants took to complete the survey, which ranged from approximately 
three minutes to 168 hours (M = 22.87 minutes, SD = 14.83), necessitating further examination. 
Through MTurk, participants can take as long as they want to complete a survey once they have 
electronically acknowledged the informed consent and started answering items. However, there 
is limited empirical evidence on required duration cut-offs in the MTurk literature, as the service 
suggests these parameters be set by the researcher (Stewart, Chandler, & Paolacci, 2017).  
As this study does not measure reaction time, the length of time was not expected to 
cause significant measurement error, except for participants that arbitrarily answered items (this 
was addressed via four attention check items throughout the questionnaire) and/or rushed 
through the survey. The principal investigator and research team members at SPU pilot tested the 
survey and identified that the approximately 250 items in the study could not be completed in 
less than 10 minutes. The informed consent form explicitly stated that the survey would take 
approximately 30 minutes. Therefore, the principal investigator designated the minimum 
duration cut-off at 600 seconds (10 minutes), resulting in 22 cases being dropped.  
MORAL TRANSGRESSIONS AND FOUNDATIONS ON DISTRESS  44 
 44 
The data was then analyzed and managed for missingness using the imputation tools in 
SPSS 26. The original data set consisted of 433 participants. Cases were dropped for participants 
missing more than 24% of their data, per recommendations for large sample sizes (N > 300) by 
Olinksy, Chen, and Harlow (2003). This resulted in 15 cases being dropped and a total sample 
size of 418 participants. Missingness was then re-examined, indicating that approximately 13% 
of the variables and 2% of the cases had some missing data; 99% of the values in the model had 
complete data. Due to the low missingness, and the inconsequential effects of imputation when 
less than 5% of the data is missing (Cheema, 2014), I analyzed the data without imputation. The 
bivariate correlations for all major study variables are presented in Table 3.  
Furthermore, I initially examined all analyses with the covariate of gender included; 
however, as gender was not a significant predictor of distress in any of the models and did not 
markedly change any results, I chose to remove this variable from my analyses in order to 
optimize statistical power and degrees of freedom (Hayes, 2013). The following results address 
each hypothesis for Part I (correlational portion) and Part II (experimental portion).  
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Table 3.  
Analysis of Major Variables and Covariates Predicting Outcomes  
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 
1. Distress                     
2. PMT Harm .27**                   
3. PMT Fair .22** .83**                  
4. PMT In-group .34** .52** .47**                 
5. PMT Authority .29** .55** .50** .71**                
6. PMT Purity .30** .67** .66** .68** .69**               
7. PMT Total .34** .86** .83** .80** .82** .88**              
8. MFQ Harm -.08  .19** .24** -.02 .01 .67** .12*             
9. MFQ Fair -.08 .19** .26** -.06 -.03 .66** .10* .65**            
10. MFQ In-group .17** -.17** -.21** .25** .21** .68** .03 .04 -.01           
11. MFQ Authority .11* -.12* -.17** .30** .27** .15**    .09 -.04 -.09 .74**          
12. MFQ Purity  .08 -.11* -.18** .23** .20** .14** .06 -.02 -.10* .67** .77**         
13. MFQ Total .08 -.05 -.08 .24* .22* .16** .11* .39** .31** .81** .82** .16**        
14. Neuroticism  .61** .18** .14** .23** .17** .18** .21** -.11* -.12* .04 .04 .18** -.03       
15. Control -.39** -.16** -.17** -.09 -.04 -.16** -.15** .01 -.03 .11* .17** -.16** .12* -.39*      
16. Avoidance .55** .12* .11 .14** .05 .09 .12* -.16** -.07 .04 -.02 .09 -.07 .54** -.42**     
17. Social Support -.36** -.03 -.04 -.02 -.01 -.03 -.03 .21** .15** .20** .13** -.03 .23** -.31** .33** -.50**    
18. TraumaExp .26** .25** .22** .23** .23** .23** .28** -.03 -.01 .07 .13** .23** .10* .10* -.04 .08 -.03   
19. Female Gender -.04 .15** .14** .07 .10* .07 .13** .26** .04 -.05 .03 .07 .09 .07 -.01 -.08 .11* .08  
Note. *p <.05, ** p<.001. PMT = Perceived Moral Transgression; MFQ = Moral Foundations Questionnaire; SocialSup = Social Support; TraumaExp 
= Trauma Exposure 
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Correlational – Part I. 
Hypothesis 1a: Perceived moral transgressions predict psychological distress. First, I 
examined the main effects of each type of PMT in predicting distress, followed by a composite 
of all perceived moral transgressions predicting distress. Each PMT was analyzed separately, 
without the other PMTs in the model, as a first, less conservative test of the PMT-distress 
hypothesis. As hypothesized (see Table 3), when examined singly, each PMT positively 
predicted distress, such that individuals who endorsed witnessing various transgressions in the 
socio-political climate within the last two weeks endorsed higher distress. A composite of all 
PMTs, as expected, significantly predicted distress (p < .001) and accounted for 11% of the 
variance in the model. These effects are depicted in Table 4.  
To explore the unique variance explained when all PMTs were included in the model as 
distinct predictors (i.e., not as a composite), psychological distress was regressed on all five 
PMTs simultaneously. Interestingly, the results indicated that only in-group/loyalty remained 
significant when all predictors were included in the model, suggesting a unique effect on distress 
by perceptions of a transgression against loyalty to the group/community after all shared 
variance between different types of PMT was removed from the equation. The four other PMT 
did not yield significant unique effects (see Table 5).   
Table 4. 
Regressions of Psychological Distress on PMT When Testing Predictors Separately  
Outcome  Predictor R2 b SE t p LLCI ULCI 
DASS  PMT Harm .08 8.12 1.40 5.80 p < .001 5.37 10.87 
DASS PMT Fairness .05 6.39 1.37 4.68 p < .001 3.70 9.07 
DASS PMT In-group .12 10.57 1.44 7.32 p < .001 7.73 13.41 
DASS PMT Auth. .08 8.85 1.45 6.10 p < .001 5.99 11.70 
DASS PMT Purity .09 8.89 1.37 6.50 p < .001 6.20 11.58 
DASS PMT Total  .11 4.02 .55 7.31 p < .001 2.94 5.10 
Note.  DASS= Depression, Anxiety, and Distress total scale; PMT= Perceived Moral Transgressions 
observed over past two weeks; CI = 95% Confidence interval.  
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Table 5.  
Regressions of Psychological Distress on PMT When Testing Predictors Simultaneously  
Outcome  Predictor b SE t p LLCI ULCI 
DASS  PMT Harm 4.36 2.59 -1.69 p = .093 -20.13 1.53 
DASS PMT Fairness -2.01 2.42 1.69 p = .406 -6.78 2.75 
DASS PMT In-group 6.89 2.20 3.14 p = .002 2.57 11.20 
DASS PMT Auth. 0.90 2.20 0.41 p = .685 -3.44 5.23 
DASS PMT Purity 2.36 2.30 1.02 p = .306 -2.17 6.88 
Note.  DASS= Depression, Anxiety, and Distress total scale; PMT= Perceived Moral Transgressions 
observed over past two weeks; CI = 95% Confidence interval. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Perceived moral transgressions predict psychological distress, 
controlling for risk factors of distress. A two-step hierarchical regression was conducted to 
examine the unique variance of PMTs (individual PMTs and composite PMT) on psychological 
distress beyond effects of risk factors. That is, all five covariates (neuroticism, perceived control, 
avoidance, social support, and trauma exposure) were input into Block 1, followed by each PMT 
in Block 2 (separately), to examine the incremental variance explained by each type of perceived 
transgression on distress. The results are presented in Table 6. 
The hierarchical multiple regression indicated that in step one all covariates (i.e., known 
risk factors of distress) significantly predicted psychological distress. Neuroticism accounted for 
11% of the variance in distress, even when controlling for the other risk factors in the model (see 
Table 6 for results, including unique variance represented as semi-partial correlations).  
As expected, results revealed that all five PMTs positively predicted psychological 
distress above and beyond known risk factors of distress (e.g., neuroticism, perceived control, 
social support, avoidance, and trauma exposure). Introducing each PMT individually (i.e., 
covariates in Block 1, PMT in Block 2) indicated that perceived transgressions uniquely 
explained variance in psychological distress. For example, with the inclusion of the harm/care 
PMT to the model, this predictor explained an additional 1.40% change in distress. Results 
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demonstrated that the strongest predictors of distress were transgressions of in-group/loyalty, 
purity/sanctity, authority/respect, and a composite of all PMT. Overall, approximately 34% of 
the variance in distress was uniquely explained by the optimally weighted combination of 
predictors; perceived transgressions accounted for up to 3% of this variance, above and beyond 
known risk factors of distress (i.e., covariates).  
Hypothesis 3a: Perceived moral transgressions predict psychological distress, 
moderated by moral foundations and controlling for risk factors of distress. Next, I tested 
moderation hypotheses via PROCESS for SPSS (Model 1; Hayes, 2013). I analyzed the models 
by testing separately the interaction between each PMT and the corresponding moral foundation 
(MF) when predicting distress, while accounting for all covariates in the model (e.g., 
neuroticism, perceived control, avoidance, social support, and trauma exposure). Results 
indicated significant main effects for moral foundations (moderator variable) of in-group/loyalty, 
purity/sanctity, and total moral foundations (a composite of all MF items); that is, individuals 
endorsing higher scores on these foundations (e.g., valuing in-group MF) reported higher 
distress. The harm/care MF, fairness/reciprocity MF, and authority/respect MF did not 
significantly predict distress (see Table 6 ).   
In addition, results of the moderation analyses suggested that the in-group/loyalty  
interaction (PMT*MFQ) positively predicted distress, followed by composite/total PMT, 
authority/respect, and fairness/reciprocity. Moderation effects were not significant for the 
harm/care dimension but were marginally significant for the purity/sanctity domain (p = .08). Of 
note, the covariates of neuroticism, perceived control, avoidance, social support, and trauma 
exposure all significantly contributed to distress across most analyses (see Table 6). Overall, the 
significant results suggest unique conditional effects, providing partial support for the theory that 
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the impact of some moral transgressions on distress is most pronounced for people high on the 
corresponding relevant moral foundation.  
Simple slopes analyses indicated that at high levels of moral foundations of in-
group/loyalty, composite/total PMT, authority/respect, and fairness/reciprocity, the relationship 
between PMT and distress was strongly positive; conversely, at low levels (e.g., low 
endorsement of each foundation), the relationship between PMT and distress became non-
significant (Table 6). Graphical representations of these conditional effects are presented in 
Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8. 
When examining the proportion of variance explained by each conditional effect, the 
interaction for in-group/loyalty accounted for the largest change in distress (R2 = .55, F(1, 405) = 
14.89, p < .001, ΔR2 =.017); that is, this interaction explained an additional 1.70% of the variance 
in distress, above and beyond known risk factors being included in the model (see Table 7). For a 
full comparison of all hypotheses for part I, please refer to Table 6. 
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Table 6. 
Coefficients of Perceived Moral Transgressions on Psychological Distress, with Moral Foundations as a Moderator and Controlling for 
Risk Factors of Distress 
 Model 1 (Risk Factors of Distress) Model 2 (Including PMT) Model 3 Interactions (PMT*MF) 
Predictor  b (SE) 95%CI b (SE) 95%CI b (SE) 95%CI 
Neuroticism 7.18 (0.77)*** [5.66, 8.70] 6.93 (0.77)*** [5.43, 8.44] 6.93 (0.77)*** [5.42, 8.45] 
Control -4.31 (1.81)* [-7.88, -.75] -3.64 (1.80)* [-7.18, -.10] -3.59 (1.82)* [-7.17., -.02] 
Avoidance 11.59 (2.29)*** [7.10, 16.09] 11.44 (2.26)*** [7.0, 15.88] 11.40 (2.28)*** [6.92, 15.88] 
Social Supp. -1.69 (0.95)^ [-3.55, .16] -1.87 (0.94)* [-3.71, -.03] -1.85 (.95)^ [-3.73, 0.01] 
Trauma Exp.  28.85 (5.25)*** [18.53, 39.16] 24.71(5.33)*** [14.23, 35.19] 24.48 (5.40)*** [13.87, 35.10] 
PMT Harm    3.63 (1.09)** [1.49, 5.76] 3.63 (1.12) ** [1.43, 5.83] 
MF Harm     .03 (1.34) [-2.61, 2.67] 
PMT*MF     .63 (1.37) [-2.07, 3.33] 
Neuroticism 7.18 (0.77)*** [5.66, 8.70] 7.07 (0.77)*** [5.55, 8.58] 7.08 (0.78)*** [5.56, 8.61] 
Control -4.31 (1.81)* [-7.88, -.75] -3.71 (1.82)* [-7.29, -.14] -3.37 (1.83)^ [-6.98, 0.23] 
Avoidance 11.59 (2.29)*** [7.10, 16.09] 11.53 (2.27)*** [7.01, 15.99] 11.41 (2.27)*** [6.95, 15.87] 
Social Supp. -1.69 (0.95)^ [-3.55, .16] -1.77 (0.94)^ [-3.62, 0.07] -1.73 (0.95)^ [-3.59, 0.13] 
Trauma Exp.  28.85 (5.25)*** [18.53, 39.16]  26.24(5.33)*** [15.77, 36.71] 25.03 (5.35)*** [14.52, 35.54] 
PMT Fair    2.52 (1.04)* [0.47, 4.57] 2.81 (1.08)** [0.69, 4.94] 
MF Fair     -0.80 (1.48) [-3.71, 2.12] 
PMT*MF     2.67 (1.37)^ [0.02, 5.37] 
Neuroticism 7.16 (0.77)*** [5.63, 8.68] 6.49 (0.77)*** [4.98, 8.00] 6.35 (0.74)*** [4.89, 7.81] 
Control -4.34 (1.81)* [-7.90, -.77] -4.27 (1.82)* [-7.74, -.80] -4.47 (1.73)* [-7.87, -1.07] 
Avoidance 11.63 (2.29)*** [7.13, 16.13] 11.32 (2.23)*** [6.94, 15.88] 10.28 (2.18)*** [5.98, 14.57] 
Social Supp. -1.67 (0.95)^ [-3.53, .19] -1.94 (0.92)* [-3.76, -.13] -2.87 (0.92)** [-4.68, -1.06] 
Trauma Exp.  28.85 (5.25)*** [18.53, 39.18] 23.56 (5.23)*** [13.27, 33.84] 21.66 (5.09)*** [11.66, 31.67] 
PMT Ingroup   5.43 (1.13)*** [3.21, 7.66] 4.60 (1.13)*** [2.38, 6.81] 
MF Ingroup     3.70 (1.05)** [1.63, 5.77] 
PMT*MF     3.56 (0.92)*** [1.75, 5.38] 
Neuroticism 7.18 (0.77)*** [5.66, 8.70] 6.60 (0.76)*** [5.11, 8.10] 6.51 (0.75)*** [5.03, 8.00] 
Control -4.31 (1.81)* [-7.88, -.75] -4.37 (1.76)* [-7.84, -.91] -4.44 (1.79)* [-7.97, -0.92] 
Avoidance 11.59 (2.29)*** [7.10, 16.09] 12.05 (2.23)*** [7.67, 16.43] 11.67 (2.21)*** [7.33, 16.01] 
Social Supp. -1.69 (0.95)^ [-3.55, .16] -1.81 (0.92)* [-3.62, .00] -2.12 (0.92)* [-3.92, -0.31] 
Trauma Exp.  28.85 (5.25)*** [18.53, 39.16] 23.28 (5.23)*** [12.99, 33.57] 22.01 (5.20)*** [11.79, 32.23] 
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PMT Auth   5.35 (1.10)*** [3.19, 7.52] 4.76 (1.12)*** [2.56, 6.97] 
MF Auth     1.77 (1.02)^ [-0.23, 3.77] 
PMT*MF     2.57 (0.97)** [0.67, 4.48] 
Neuroticism 7.18 (0.77)*** [5.66, 8.70] 6.78 (0.76)*** [5.29, 8.28] 6.69 (0.76)*** [5.20, 8.18] 
Control -4.31 (1.81)* [-7.88, -.75] -3.37 (1.78)^ [-6.88, .13] -3.87 (1.78)* [-7.37, -0.37] 
Avoidance 11.59 (2.29)*** [7.10, 16.09] 11.82 (2.23)*** [7.42, 16.21] 11.85 (2.22)*** [7.48, 16.21] 
Social Supp. -1.69 (0.95)^ [-3.55, .16] -1.88 (0.92)* [-3.69, -.06] -2.07 (0.92)* [-3.88, -0.26] 
Trauma Exp.  28.85 (5.25)*** [18.53, 39.16] 23.59(5.26)*** [-33.90, -13.26] 21.88 (5.26)*** [11.54, 32.22] 
PMT Purity   4.78 (1.05)*** [2.71, 6.85] 4.45 (1.06)*** [2.37, 6.53] 
MF Purity     1.46 (0.74)* [0.01, 2.91] 
PMT*MF     1.21 (0.69)^ [-0.15, 2.57] 
Neuroticism 7.16 (0.77)*** [5.63, 8.68] 6.62 (0.76)*** [5.13, 8.13] 6.54 (0.75)*** [5.06, 8.01] 
Control -4.34 (1.81)* [-7.90, -.77] -3.55 (1.77)* [-7.04, -.06] -3.85 (1.75)* [-7.29, -0.41] 
Avoidance 11.63 (2.29)*** [7.13, 16.13] 11.63 (2.23)*** [7.25, 16.01] 11.11 (2.19)*** [6.80, 15.42] 
Social Supp. -1.67 (0.95)^ [-3.53, .19] -1.92 (0.92)* [-3.73, -.10] -2.65 (0.93)** [-4.47, -0.82] 
Trauma Exp.  28.85 (5.25)*** [18.53, 39.18] 22.21 (5.29)*** [11.80, 32.63] 19.43 (5.25)** [9.11, 29.74] 
PMT Total    2.09 (0.44)*** [1.24, 2.95] 1.94 (0.43)*** [1.10, 2.79] 
MFQ Total     4.50 (1.53)** [1.49, 7.51] 
PMT*MF     1.46 (0.54)** [0.41, 2.52] 
Note.  ^p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, PMT= Perceived Moral Transgressions observed over past two weeks. MF = Moral Foundation; Control = Perceived 
Locus of Control; Social Supp. = Social Support. Trauma Exp. = Trauma Exposure. sr2 = represents the semi-partial correlation squared.  
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Table 7. 
Simple Slopes of Perceived Moral Transgressions on Distress, Moderated by Corresponding Moral 
Foundations and Controlling for Risk Factors of Distress 
Outcome Measure: Distress (DASS) 
MF (Moderator) Coefficient Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped LLCI Bootstrapped ULCI 
Fair -1SD 0.84 1.45 -2.02 3.70 
Fair +1SD 4.79 1.51 1.82 7.75 
Ingroup -1SD 1.02 1.44 -1.80 3.85 
Ingroup +1SD 8.17 1.48 5.26 11.08 
Authority-1SD 2.05 1.53 -0.96 5.06 
Authority+1SD 7.47 1.50 4.52 10.42 
Purity -1SD 2.75 1.45 -.10 5.61 
Purity +1SD 6.14 1.41 3.36 8.93 
TotalMF -1SD 0.95 0.57 -0.16 2.06 
TotalMF +1SD 2.94 0.56 1.83 4.04 
Note. DASS= Depression, Anxiety, and Distress total scale; PMT= Perceived Moral Transgression; 
MF = Moral Foundation; SE = standard error; LLCI = lower limit 95% confidence interval; ULCI = 
upper limit 95% confidence interval.  
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Figure 5. Graphical representation of the significant conditional effect of fairness/reciprocity 
PMT*MF on psychological distress, controlling for risk factors of distress.    
 
 
Figure 5. Graphical representation of the significant conditional effect of in-group/loyalty 
PMT*MF on psychological distress, controlling for risk factors of distress.
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Figure 6. Graphical representation of the significant conditional effect of authority/respect 
PMT*MF on psychological distress, controlling for risk factors of distress.    
 
   
Figure 7. Graphical representation of the significant conditional effect of composite/total 
PMT*MF on psychological distress, controlling for risk factors of distress.    
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In summary, results from the correlational portion of the study demonstrated that (1) each 
PMT (harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity) 
separately predicted distress, (2) even when controlling for risk factors of distress (neuroticism, 
perceived control, avoidance, social support, and trauma exposure); this was consistent with my 
hypotheses. Conversely, when all PMTs were simultaneously included in the same hierarchical 
model, only the in-group/loyalty PMT remained significant, evidencing shared variance among 
PMTs and unique effects of perceived transgressions in the domain of group affiliation and 
loyalty. Finally, the results of the (3) interactions between each PMT and their corresponding 
moral foundation (e.g., fairness PMT*fairness MF) indicated significant conditional effects for 
the in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, fairness/reciprocity, and composite transgressions 
domains. Specifically, simple slopes analyses revealed that at high levels of each MF, the 
relationship between PMT and distress was significant and positive, demonstrating an amplified 
conditional effect (PMT*MF) on psychological distress.  
Experimental – Part II. 
For the experimental task (i.e., Part II), the dataset contained the same 418 participants, 
as all participants completed both the correlational and experimental phases of this one-time 
study. In order to examine within-person comparisons in the experimental portion, the data was 
restructured for multilevel modeling. That is, each participant produced three different data 
points nested (at level 1) within persons (level 2; e.g., data points for the control condition and 
two randomly assigned experimental conditions). This permitted examining experimental versus 
control conditions as within-person effects, enhancing statistical power. In addition, the 
conditions were counterbalanced in Qualtrics (the survey host) to minimize potential order 
effects. Cell sizes for each comparison were slightly different, as some participants did not 
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complete all assigned conditions (harm/care vs. control, n = 166; fairness/reciprocity vs. control, 
n = 170; in-group/loyalty vs. control, n = 171; authority/respect vs. control, n = 172; 
purity/sanctity vs. control, n = 166). All predictors were grand-mean centered, with the exception 
of condition, for which experimental vignettes were coded as 1 and the control vignette coded as 
0. Furthermore, I included baseline distress (average of the anxiety and depression items; e.g., 
“nervous,” “sad,” “hopeless”) from the shortened Profile of Mood States inventory (POMS; Lorr 
& McNair, 1971) as a covariate in order to examine effects of conditions and other predictors on 
residual change in distress emotions from before to after exposure to transgression vignettes. 
Controlling for baseline distress prior to transgression exposures allowed the effects of condition 
on distress to reflect emotional reactivity.  
Hypothesis 1b: Experimental manipulation of perceived moral transgressions will 
elicit psychological distress, relative to a control condition. To investigate the effect of PMTs 
(two of five randomly assigned to each participant) versus the control condition on distress, I 
first analyzed the experimental condition effects without any covariates in the model. As 
expected, results indicated that four of the five PMT manipulations (harm/care, 
fairness/reciprocity, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity) experimentally elicited an increase in 
distress from baseline. In other words, individuals reported increased distress immediately after 
being exposed to depictions of harm, lack of fairness, disrespecting authority, and violations of 
perceived purity (see Table 8). Surprisingly, the only PMT that was not significant was in-
group/loyalty, suggesting that this condition did not predict a change in distress levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
MORAL TRANSGRESSIONS AND FOUNDATIONS ON DISTRESS  57 
 57 
Table 8. 
Parameter Estimates for Multilevel Models of Perceived Moral Transgressions Predicting Distress 
 Post-PMT Condition Distress (Outcome) 
Variable b (SE) p LLCI ULCI 
Baseline Distress 0.62 (0.06)  < .001 0.51 0.73 
PMT Harm vs. Control 0.55 (0.06)  < .001 0.44 0.66 
Baseline Distress 0.71 (0.05)  < .001 0.61 0.81 
PMT Fairness vs. Control  0.29 (0.05)  < .001 0.19 0.39 
Baseline Distress 0.77 (0.05)  < .001 0.68 0.87 
PMT Ingroup vs. Control  -0.00 (0.04)   .99 -0.07 0.07 
Baseline Distress 0.73 (0.05)  < .001 0.62 0.84 
PMT Authority vs. Control 0.19 (0.05)  < .001 0.09 0.29 
Baseline Distress 0.63 (0.06)  < .001 0.52 0.74 
PMT Purity vs. Control  0.14 (0.06)   .012 0.03 0.25 
Note.  Unstandardized coefficients reported. PMT= Perceived Moral Transgressions.  
  
 Hypothesis 2b. Experimental manipulation of perceived moral transgressions 
predicting increased psychological distress relative to a control condition, even when 
controlling for known risk factors of distress. In the next step, I examined each PMT versus 
control condition while accounting for risk factors of distress, including neuroticism, perceived 
control, avoidance, social support, and trauma history; additionally, I controlled for baseline 
distress. Consistent with findings, when controlling for risk factors, all PMTs (harm/care, 
fairness/reciprocity, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity), with the exception of in-
group/loyalty, significantly predicted distress above and beyond the established risk factors of 
psychological distress (see Table 9). 
 Across all analyses, the covariates were not significant, with only marginal significance 
for effects of social support and trauma history on distress in the harm/care condition and 
neuroticism in the authority/respect condition. As depicted in the table, the harm/care PMT 
condition demonstrated the greatest increase in distress; that is, there was a significant positive 
effect of perceived moral transgressions of harm/care on distress, such that there was a .55 
difference between the experimental (harm/care PMT) and control conditions.   
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Table 9. 
Parameter Estimates for Multilevel Models of Perceived Moral Transgressions Predicting Distress, 
Controlling for Known Risk Factors of Distress 
 Post-PMT Condition Distress (Outcome) 
Variable b (SE) p LLCI ULCI 
Neuroticism -0.00 (0.01) .42 -0.02 0.01 
Control -0.01 (0.02) .76 -0.04 0.03 
Avoidance 0.00 (0.01) .74 -0.02 0.03 
Social Supp. 0.01 (0.00) .06 -0.00 0.02 
Trauma Exp.  0.05 (0.03) .08 -0.01 0.11 
Baseline Distress 0.63 (0.07) < .001 0.50 0.77 
PMT Harm vs. Control 0.55 (0.06) < .001 0.44 0.67 
Neuroticism -0.00 (0.00) .68 -0.01 0.01 
Control -0.01 (0.01) .62 -0.04 0.02 
Avoidance -0.01 (0.01) .45 -0.03 0.01 
Social Supp. 0.00 (0.00) .85 -0.01 0.01 
Trauma Exp.  0.01 (0.03) .82 -0.04 0.06 
Baseline Distress 0.74 (0.07) < .001 0.60 0.88 
PMT Fairness vs. Control  0.29 (0.05) < .001 0.19 0.39 
Neuroticism 0.00 (0.00) .74 -0.01 0.01 
Control 0.01 (0.01) .65 -0.02 0.03 
Avoidance 0.00 (0.01) .78 -0.01 0.02 
Social Supp. 0.00 (0.00) .18 -0.00 0.01 
Trauma Exp.  -0.03 (0.02) .20 -0.07 0.02 
Baseline Distress 0.81 (0.06) < .001 0.69 0.92 
PMT Ingroup vs. Control  -0.00 (0.04) .90 -0.08 0.07 
Neuroticism 0.01 (0.01) .07 -0.00 0.02 
Control 0.01 (0.01) .49 -0.02 0.04 
Avoidance 0.00 (0.01) .66 -0.01 0.02 
Social Supp. 0.00 (0.00) .27 -0.00 0.01 
Trauma Exp.  -0.02 (0.02) .35 -0.07 0.03 
Baseline Distress 0.69 (0.07) < .001 0.56 0.83 
PMT Authority vs. Control 0.19 (0.05) < .001 0.09 0.29 
Neuroticism -0.00 (0.00) .47 -0.01 0.01 
Control -0.01 (0.01) .46 -0.04 0.02 
Avoidance 0.01 (0.01) .17 -0.01 0.03 
Social Supp. 0.00 (0.00) .33 -0.00 0.01 
Trauma Exp.  0.01 (0.03) .79 -0.05 0.06 
Baseline Distress 0.63 (0.07) < .001 0.49 0.77 
PMT Purity vs. Control  0.14 (0.06) .02 0.03 0.25 
Note.  Unstandardized coefficients reported. PMT= Perceived Moral Transgressions. LLCI = lower limit 
95% confidence interval; ULCI = upper limit 95% confidence interval. 
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 Hypothesis 3b: The experimental effect of perceived moral transgressions on 
increased distress, relative to a control condition, will be amplified by corresponding moral 
foundations (e.g., purity PMT*purity MF), even when accounting for known risk factors of 
distress. Next, I examined the conditional effects of moral foundations on the relationship 
between PMT and distress, compared to a control condition (i.e., within-person variability). 
Similar to the prior analyses, I used the MIXED command on SPSS, including the interaction 
term for each pair of corresponding PMT and MF. As the results were consistent with and 
without the covariates (e.g., neuroticism, perceived control, avoidance, social support, trauma 
history), covariates were included in the model to provide the most conservative estimate of the 
effects; thus, the results demonstrate the unique variance explained by the interaction of PMT 
and moral foundations on psychological distress, above and beyond the risk factors of distress.  
 Results revealed a significant interaction between fairness/reciprocity moral foundations 
and fairness/reciprocity PMT on distress, compared to the control condition (see graphical 
representation Figure 9). There was a marginally significant conditional effect of in-
group/loyalty MF*PMT on distress, relative to the control condition, however the direction of 
the interaction was negative, which was inconsistent with hypotheses.  Contrary to hypotheses, 
there were no significant interaction effects for PMT*MF of harm/care, authority/respect, or 
purity/sanctity; results for fairness and in-group are represented in Table 11.  
In addition, I probed the conditional effects of PMT*MF. Simple slopes analyses 
indicated that at high levels of the MF of fairness/reciprocity, the relationship between PMT 
fairness/reciprocity, compared to a control group, and distress was positive and significant. At 
low levels of the fairness/reciprocity MF, the effect became insignificant. Of note, when I probed 
the in-group/loyalty conditional effects at high and low levels of the in-group/loyalty MF, the 
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effects were non-significant. Interestingly, at high levels of purity/sanctity MF, the interaction 
between purity/sanctity MF and PMT, compared to a control condition, was significant and 
positive (Table 10).  
When examining the proportion of variance explained by each conditional effect, the 
interaction for fairness/reciprocity PMT vs. control*MF accounted for the largest change in 
distress (R2 = .47, F(1, 326) = 4.58, p = .03, ΔR2 =.01); that is, this conditional effect explained 
an additional 1.0% of the variance in distress, above and beyond known risk factors being 
included in the model (see Table 11). 
Table 10. 
Parameter Estimates for Multilevel Models of Perceived Moral Transgressions Predicting Distress, 
Controlling for Baseline Distress and Known Risk Factors of Distress 
 Post-PMT Condition Distress (Outcome) 
Variable b (SE) p LLCI ULCI 
Neuroticism -0.00 (0.01)   .42 -0.02 0.01 
Control -0.01 (0.02)  .78 -0.04 0.03 
Avoidance 0.00 (0.01)  .74 -0.02 0.03 
Social Supp. 0.01 (0.00)  .08 -0.00 0.02 
Trauma Exp.  0.05 (0.03)  .08 -0.01 0.11 
Baseline Distress 0.63 (0.07) < .001 0.49 0.77 
PMT Harm vs. Control 0.55 (0.06) < .001 0.44 0.67 
MF Harm (Moderator) 0.01 (0.08) .91 -0.14 0.16 
PMT*MF Harm 0.05 (0.07)  .50 -0.09 0.19 
Neuroticism -0.00 (0.00)  .67 -0.01 0.01 
Control -0.01 (0.01)  .59 -0.04 0.02 
Avoidance -0.01 (0.01)  .46 -0.03 0.01 
Social Supp. 0.00 (0.00)  .83 -0.01 0.01 
Trauma Exp.  0.01 (0.03)  .83 -0.04 0.06 
Baseline Distress 0.74 (0.07) < .001 0.60 0.88 
PMT Fairness vs. Control  0.29 (0.05) < .001 0.19 0.39 
MF Fairness  -0.10 (0.07) .16 -0.24 0.04 
PMT*MF Fairness 0.23 (0.07) .001 0.10 0.37 
Neuroticism 0.00 (0.00)  .76 -0.01 0.01 
Control 0.02 (0.01) .85 -0.02 0.03 
Avoidance -0.00 (0.01) .82 -0.02 0.01 
Social Supp. 0.00 (0.00)  .80 -0.01 0.01 
Trauma Exp.  -0.03 (0.02)  .19 -0.07 0.01 
Baseline Distress 0.78 (0.06) < .001 0.67 0.89 
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PMT Ingroup vs. Control  -0.01 (0.04)  .86 -0.08 0.07 
MF Ingroup 0.18 (0.04) < .001 0.09 0.27 
PMT*MF Ingroup -0.06 (0.04)  .08 -0.13 0.01 
Neuroticism 0.01 (0.01) .07 -0.00 0.02 
Control 0.01 (0.01) .54 -0.02 0.04 
Avoidance 0.00 (0.01) .68 -0.02 0.02 
Social Supp. 0.00 (0.00) .36 -0.00 0.01 
Trauma Exp.  -0.02 (0.02) .33 -0.07 0.02 
Baseline Distress 0.69 (0.07)  < .001 0.56 0.82 
PMT Authority vs. Control 0.19 (0.05)  < .001 0.09 0.29 
MF Authority  0.05 (0.06) .36 -0.06 0.16 
PMT*MF Authority -0.00 (0.05)  .98 -0.10 0.10 
Neuroticism -0.00 (0.00)  .36 -0.01 0.01 
Control -0.02 (0.01)  .27 -0.04 0.01 
Avoidance 0.01 (0.01) .20 -0.01 0.03 
Social Supp. 0.00 (0.00) .41 -0.00 0.01 
Trauma Exp.  -0.01 (0.03) .84 -0.06 0.05 
Baseline Distress 0.64 (0.07) < .001 0.50 0.78 
PMT Purity vs. Control  0.14 (0.06)  .01 0.03 0.25 
MF Purity 0.07 (0.04) .10 -0.01 0.14 
PMT*MF Purity -0.06 (0.04)  .17 -0.02 0.14 
Note.  Unstandardized coefficients reported. PMT= Perceived Moral Transgressions. LLCI = lower limit 
95% confidence interval; ULCI = upper limit 95% confidence interval. 
 
Table 11. 
Simple Slopes of Perceived Moral Transgressions on Distress, Moderated by Corresponding Moral 
Foundations and Accounting for Baseline Distress and Risk Factors of Distress 
Outcome Measure: Distress (DASS) 
MF (Moderator) Coefficient Bootstrapped SE Bootstrapped 
LLCI 
Bootstrapped ULCI 
Fair -1SD 0.12 0.11 -0.10 0.34 
Mean 0.29 0.08 0.13 0.44 
Fair +1SD 0.45 0.11 0.24 0.67 
Ingroup -1SD -0.06 0.09 -0.12 0.23 
Mean -0.01 0.06 -0.13 0.12 
Ingroup +1SD 0.05 0.09 -0.24 0.11 
Note. DASS= Depression, Anxiety, and Distress total scale; PMT= Perceived Moral Transgression; MF = 
Moral Foundation; SE = standard error; LLCI = lower limit confidence interval; ULCI = upper limit 
confidence interval. All variables were grand-mean centered. 
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Figure 8. Graphical representation of the significant conditional effect of fairness/reciprocity 
PMT*MF on psychological distress, compared to a control condition, accounting for baseline 
distress and known risk factors of distress.    
 
In summary, results from the experimental portion (within-person variability) of the study 
indicated that (1) four of the five experimental PMTs (vignettes depicting harm/care, 
fairness/reciprocity, authority/loyalty, and purity/sanctity), compared to the control condition, 
predicted an increase in distress, (2) those same four of five experimental PMTs (harm/care, 
fairness/reciprocity, authority/loyalty, and purity/sanctity), compared to the control condition, 
predicted an increase in distress, even when controlling for risk factors of distress (neuroticism, 
perceived control, avoidance, social support, and trauma exposure). The harm/care PMT 
condition predicted the greatest change in distress between the control and experimental 
conditions. Results of the (3) interactions between the fairness/reciprocity PMT vs. control 
condition and the corresponding moral foundation of fairness/reciprocity (PMT 
fairness/reciprocity*MF fairness/reciprocity) was the only significant conditional effect, but this 
effect was in line with hypotheses. Simple slopes analyses suggested that individuals who 
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endorse high levels of the moral foundation of fairness/reciprocity also experienced a significant 
increase in distress, as evidenced by the difference between the PMT versus control conditions. 
The subsequent discussion will explore the implications of these results.  
Chapter 4: Discussion  
Past research has elucidated several risk factors that contribute to psychological distress 
(i.e., anxiety and depression symptoms), such as neuroticism, low perceived control, avoidance, 
poor social support, and trauma history (Barlow, 2000; Brown & Barlow, 2009; Litz et al., 2009; 
Miller et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2014). However, there is limited research on the unique 
contribution of moral experiences, such as perceptions of moral transgressions in the socio-
political-cultural climate, on emotional health (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Lench et al., 2018). Thus, 
the present findings implicate perceived moral transgressions (PMT) as relatively unexplored 
constructs that may predict changes in distress, specifically in response to perceived events 
(related to how people treat one another) in the larger social-political world.  
As moral transgressions are correlated with distress (Litz et al., 2009) in military 
populations, I conducted a two-part study (correlational and experimental portions) to examine 
whether distress is explained by individuals’ interpretations of the social and political climate, 
beyond military-specific contexts. This study was prompted by my (i.e., principal investigator) 
observations of partisan divisiveness in the United States and how perceptions of moral 
transgressions (often along partisan lines) have elicited distress in clients. Therefore, I 
hypothesized that exposure to perceived moral transgressions in the social climate would 
positively predict distress in a convenience sample of U.S. residing individuals (N = 418). I also 
expected the relationship between PMT and distress to remain significant even when accounting 
for known risk factors of distress, including neuroticism, perceived control, avoidance, social 
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support, and trauma history. In addition, I hypothesized each PMT would interact with its 
corresponding moral foundation (e.g., purity PMT*purity MF) to positively predict distress. Of 
note, the correlational and experimental portions of this study had parallel hypotheses, allowing 
for both between-person (distress after exposure to other-toward-other PMTs over the past two 
weeks) and within-person analysis (momentary assessment of distress after reading a control 
vignette and random assignment of two out of five PMT vignettes). 
Major Findings 
 PMTs as Individual Predictors of Psychological Distress (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). First, 
results supported hypothesized positive associations between perceived moral transgressions and 
psychological distress, in line with the moral injury literature (e.g., Litz et al., 2009); each PMT 
separately predicted distress in the correlational portion of the study. That is, higher distress was 
associated with endorsement of perceiving actions between people in the socio-political climate 
as 1) harmful (e.g., “to what extent have people been unkind and harsh toward one another?”), 2) 
unfair (e.g., “to what extent have people been treated unequally?”), 3) disloyal to their in-group 
(e.g., “to what extent have people not been faithful to the idea of what this country stands for”), 
4) disrespectful to authority (e.g., “to what extent have people not shown respect to their 
leaders?”), and 5) violating standards of purity (e.g., “to what extent have people engaged in 
dirty deeds?”). Across each PMT, in addition to a composite of all perceived moral 
transgressions, the proportion of variance explained in distress ranged from 5% 
(fairness/reciprocity) to 12% (in-group/loyalty). These first analyses provided preliminary 
evidence that moral transgressions are relevant to psychological distress symptoms.  
 In addition, I sought to explore the unique variance explained when all PMTs were included 
in the model (as distinct predictors); when regressing distress on all five PMTs simultaneously, 
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results revealed that in-group/loyalty was the only PMT that remained significant. Given that all 
effects were significant when separately examined, this interesting finding suggests there is a 
large amount of shared variance among the types of transgressions. Covariance between PMTs 
indicates that shared variance was being thrown out when examining unique effects. It is unclear 
why only in-group/loyalty transgressions uniquely predicted distress above and beyond the 
shared variance, but this finding implies that these items had a unique effect even when 
accounting for the substantial variance shared among PMT scales. Inspection of PMT 
intercorrelations suggests that some scales were more highly intercorrelated (e.g., harm/care and 
fairness) relative to those with in-group/loyalty, and in the EFA, in-group/loyalty items were 
more likely to load on the “binding” component which explained much less variance than the 
larger “individualizing” component (Graham et al., 2009).   
 In the experimental portion of the study, four of the five PMT conditions elicited an increase 
in distress (pre vs. post) after reading the moral transgressions in the dimensions of harm/care 
(e.g., road rage accident leading to a murder), fairness/reciprocity (e.g., racial discrimination at a 
coffee shop), authority/respect, (e.g., students and their parents disrespecting a teacher), and 
purity/sanctity (e.g., a parent marrying their daughter). However, distress unexpectedly did not 
significantly change between the control and in-group/loyalty condition (e.g., an Olympic athlete 
for the US using illicit drugs during competition). This finding might potentially be attributed to 
the fact that this news article was not as recent as the other four PMTs, or the fact that some 
individuals do not consider sports teams as part of their in-group (Brewer & Brown, 1998). In 
addition, the conflicting findings between the correlational and experimental portions of this 
study could be due to possible habituation and desensitization (e.g., via more exposure on the 
news media; Scharrer, 2008) to moral transgressions in the current sociopolitical climate; thus, 
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the news article about Lance Armstrong misusing substances (“doping”) and reportedly 
betraying his country/in-group may not have been a strong enough PMT to elicit distress in the 
moment. Future studies should include a broader range of vignettes or scenarios to limit the risk 
of vignette-specific effects. Nonetheless, the experimental effects paint the same picture as the 
correlational results—namely, that perceived moral transgressions about the social-political 
climate impact distress symptoms.  
 PMTs as Individual Predictors of Psychological Distress, Controlling for Risk Factors 
of Distress (Hypotheses 2a and 2b). When exploring the unique effects of PMTs on distress, I 
controlled for known risk factors of distress (neuroticism, perceived control, avoidance, social 
support, and trauma exposure) to examine the unique variance explained by moral transgressions 
beyond these factors. Results across both correlational and experimental portions of the study 
revealed that PMTs are associated with higher distress between people, as well as changes in 
distress within individuals. Specifically, all five PMTs positively predicted distress above and 
beyond risk factors of distress in the correlational portion; altogether, the PMTs accounted for 
approximately 13% of the variance in distress.  
Similarly, in the experimental portion of the study, four of the five PMT experimental 
conditions (harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity) elicited a 
significant increase in distress, controlling for baseline levels. These findings are consistent with 
the correlational portion and demonstrate that individuals who were exposed to vignettes based 
on real-life news articles depicting harm to others, unfair discrimination, disrespect to people in 
authority positions, and impure actions between people, compared to a control condition, 
experienced an increase in distress immediately after reading these vignettes (controlling for 
baseline distress and risk factors of distress). This interesting finding may be related to disgust 
MORAL TRANSGRESSIONS AND FOUNDATIONS ON DISTRESS  67 
 67 
sensitivity and provide further justification for intuitive models of morality (Haidt et al., 1994; 
Haidt & Graham, 2007). 
 Surprisingly, the in-group/loyalty experimental manipulation was the only PMT that did not 
significantly predict distress. This may be due to the nature of the actual vignette content or 
possible semantic encoding differences when interpreting this vignette (Dunham, Baron, & 
Carey, 2011). Although the experimental condition intended to illustrate moral violations to 
one’s group, research has demonstrated that in-group determination varies significantly between 
people (Aronson, Wilson, Akert, & Sommers, 2013); for example, some individuals may 
consider their in-group to be their immediate family or religious community, whereas others may 
identify their in-group as their ethnicity or political affiliation (Graham et al., 2009).  
 Consistent with previous findings (Barlow, 2002; Brown & Barlow, 2009; Costa & 
McCrae, 1992; Kendler et al., 2003; Wang et al., 2014), all covariates in the correlational portion 
(neuroticism, perceived control, avoidance, social support, and trauma exposure) positively 
predicted distress, lending evidence to the transdiagnostic, dimensional nature of distress (Brown 
et al., 2004; Brown & Barlow, 2009). Of note, the covariates were non-significant for the 
experimental design; that is, they did not predict distress in a meaningful, interpretable way. This 
may be attributable to the experimental induction, suggesting that its effects were strong enough 
to situationally wash out any effects of pre-existing characteristics such as neuroticism, 
perceived lack of control over the transgression, avoidance, limited social supports, or trauma 
histories.  
In line with this assertion, pre-existing moral foundations (MF) did not consistently predict 
increased distress in the experimental portion (i.e., only in-group/loyalty MF predicted higher 
distress), which might be due to the strong emotionally evocative nature of the manipulations 
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(PMTs). This finding provides further evidence of Haidt and colleagues’ (2000) claim that 
individuals often experience strong, visceral, intuitive responses to morally-valanced stimuli 
without being able to articulate their reasoning, a process termed moral dumbfounding (Haidt et 
al., 1993). However, in the correlational portion, in-group/loyalty, purity, and total MF (and 
marginally, authority) predicted higher distress, suggesting the possibility that individuals higher 
in these “binding” functions are more prone to distress in general. This fits with previous studies 
finding small positive associations between psychological conservatism, proneness to anxiety, 
and the need to manage uncertainty (Jost & Amodio, 2012; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & 
Sulloway, 2003).    
Furthermore, there is ample evidence in the literature suggesting exposure to traumatic 
events is associated with elevated PTSD, depression, and anxiety (Bryan et al., 2016; Koenig et 
al., 2018; Volk & Koenig, 2018), as well as the development of moral injury as a distinct 
syndrome (i.e., separate from PTSD; Nash et al., 2010). However, the majority of these studies 
utilized veteran or active duty service members, which limits their generalizability to other 
populations beyond the military. Surprisingly, there is also a dearth of research on morally 
injurious events as a predictor of distress, rather than an outcome (Koenig, Youssef, & Pearce, 
2019). In turn, this study sought to fill this gap by examining perceptions of moral transgressions 
on emotional well-being in a civilian population, while accounting for known risk factors of 
distress, such as trauma history. Trauma history consistently predicted distress in the 
correlational portion, but not in the experimental portion (in line with the idea that the 
manipulation overwhelmed the effects of preexisting traits). These findings contribute to the 
literature on moral injury by demonstrating that exposure to moral transgressions in the larger 
sociopolitical climate uniquely predicts distress. Moreover, the current study systematically 
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examined transgressions in several domains which parallel moral foundations theory (harm, 
fairness, in-group, authority, purity; Graham et al., 2011), demonstrating that type of perceived 
moral transgression may be relevant to determining the level of distress one experiences. 
Therefore, the current study demonstrates the unique contribution of perceived moral 
transgressions on affective processing of moral events, especially those elicited in the moment, 
above and beyond established risk factors of distress.  
 Conditional Effects of PMT*MF on Psychological Distress, Controlling for Risk 
Factors of Distress (Hypotheses 3a and 3b). In order to better understand the process of 
interpreting moral events observed in the socio-political climate, I examined the interaction 
between PMTs and participants’ moral foundations—belief systems that influence moral 
reasoning and decision-making (Dobolvi, 2019; Haidt, 2013). For the correlational portion, the 
conditional effects indicated that moral foundations of in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, 
fairness/reciprocity, and a composite of all moral foundations interacted with the corresponding 
PMTs (e.g., fairness MF*fairness PMT) in predicting higher distress. That is, endorsing high 
levels on the respective moral foundations amplified the distressing effects of perceived moral 
transgressions of fairness, in-group, or authority over the past two weeks. Simple slopes analysis 
confirmed that at higher levels of moral foundations, the relationship between PMT and distress 
was positive, whereas the effect of PMT on distress tended to be non-significant in individuals 
low on the foundations. This may indicate that stronger moral convictions (i.e., moral decisions 
based in MF) are a predisposing factor for how individuals perceive events in the socio-political 
climate (Skitka & Morgan, 2014) above and beyond known risk factors of distress.  
 Conversely, when assessing for the conditional effects on the path from PMT to distress as a 
function of the moderator of moral foundations in the experimental portion, results diverged 
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from the correlational analysis. Specifically, only fairness/reciprocity PMT*MF produced a 
significant increase in distress, compared to the control condition, from baseline. That is, 
participants who were exposed to this vignette, which depicted lack of fairness between people 
(other toward other), endorsed increased distress in the moment. This finding may be attributed 
to the nature of the vignette, which was taken from a news-article on racial discrimination. As 
experiences of inequality and experienced racism have negative health implications, even at the 
level of genetic expression (Thames, Irwin, Breen, & Cole, 2019), this conditional effect 
provides further causal evidence of the impact of perceived inequality on emotional well-being. 
 The discrepancy between the experimental and correlational findings with regard to 
interaction effects is worth noting (e.g., Part I demonstrated significant interactions in domains of 
in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and fairness/reciprocity whereas the experimental part only 
found a significant conditional effect of fairness PMT*MF on distress). This discrepancy might 
be explained by the content of the items, potential confounds, shared variance among perceived 
moral transgressions and moral foundations (Graham et al., 2011), or intensity of emotion 
induced in the moment [after exposure to a PMT condition]. Along with the fact that trait effects 
were less predictive in the experimental part, it may be that the experimental induction was 
intense enough to constitute a “strong situation” that trumps personality effects, whereas 
“weaker” situations that are more ambiguous or less constrained provide greater opportunity for 
trait effects or trait-by-situation interactions. In addition, one potential factor that may explain 
these relationships is political affiliation, as research has shown differences between liberals and 
conservatives in emotional sensitivity to moral stimuli (Graham et al., 2009); for example, 
McCann (2008) found that individuals who identified as conservative tended to demonstrate 
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elevated emotional reactivity to stimuli that violated respect for authority and maintenance of the 
social order, compared to their liberal counterparts.  
 Future studies should control for political identity in order to disentangle its effects from 
perceived moral transgressions observed in the sociopolitical climate. Accounting for political 
affiliation would provide further evidence of the unique contribution of PMT to distress. 
Examining differences in binding versus individualizing foundations (i.e., due to shared variance 
between PMT, based on results of the EFA) is also recommended. An overview of correlational 
and experimental findings is presented in Table 12.  
Table 12. 
Overview of Correlational and Experimental Examination of Perceived Moral Transgressions 
Predicting Distress and Controlling for Known Risk Factors of Distress 
Study Portion & Relevant Findings 
 
Correlational (Part 1) Experimental (Part 2) 
Individual PMTs Predicting Distress • Harm/care 
• Fairness/reciprocity 
• In-group/loyalty 
• Authority/respect 
• Purity/sanctity  
• Harm/care 
• Fairness/reciprocity 
• Authority/respect 
• Purity/sanctity 
Individual PMTs Simultaneous 
Entry  
• In-group/loyalty 
 
• N/A 
Individual PMTs Predicting 
Distress, Controlling for Risk 
Factors of Distress 
• Harm/care 
• Fairness/reciprocity 
• In-group/loyalty 
• Authority/respect 
• Purity/sanctity 
• Harm/care 
• Fairness/reciprocity 
• Authority/respect 
• Purity/sanctity 
Conditional Effect of PMT*MF on 
Distress, Controlling for Risk 
Factors of Distress (and Baseline 
Distress in Experimental Portion) 
• In-group/loyalty 
• Total PMT*MFQ 
• Authority/respect 
• Fairness/reciprocity  
• Fairness/reciprocity 
 
 
Clinical Implications 
 Research indicates that moral experiences can directly impact psychiatric distress, as 
evidenced through literature on the development of moral injury in military populations (Litz et 
al., 2009; Maguen & Litz, 2012; Maguen et al., 2017). However, to date, past studies have 
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predominantly focused on moral injury as an outcome of traumatic events, particularly in the 
context of co-occurring PTSD (Barnes, Hurley, & Taber, 2019; Koenig, Youssef, & Pearce, 
2019). Although this construct is well-established in veteran and active duty samples (see Koenig 
et al., 2019 for review of the literature), there is limited research on moral injury in civilian 
populations (Currier, Holland, Rojas-Flores, Herrera, & Foy, 2015b). To that end, there is even 
less empirical research on the predictive or downstream effects of perceptions of moral 
transgressions on emotional well-being in U.S. residing civilians. Thus, the purpose of this two-
part study was to better understand the relative contribution of perceived moral transgressions on 
distress in individuals’ daily lives, within the context of the larger macro-system (socio-political 
climate).  
 In today’s society, we are inundated with information from various sources, such as the 
news, conversations with others, and social media. Often, the way we appraise and judge this 
information is based in our moral belief systems (Gray et al., 2014; Haidt & Graham, 2007) and 
interpretations of others’ actions (Tepe & Aydinli-Karakulak, 2019). In turn, these perceptions 
may elicit negative emotional reactions. As demonstrated, research to date has attempted to 
understand what factors contribute to psychological distress, identifying risk factors such as 
neuroticism (Brown & Barlow, 2009; Keightley et al., 2003; Stein et al., 2007; Westlye et al., 
2011), perceived uncontrollability (Barlow 2000; Miller et al., 2007), avoidance behaviors 
(Barlow, 2000; Brown & Barlow, 2009), poor social support (Hefner & Eisenberg, 2009; 
Lewinsohn, Gotlin, & Seeley, 1997), and exposure to trauma (Litz et al., 2009). However, the 
present study demonstrates that perceptions of moral transgressions both correlationally and 
causally impact distress, above and beyond these well-established risk factors for anxiety and 
depression. This may suggest a new approach to intervention with clients who present to 
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behavioral health with elevated psychiatric distress, not better explained by other stressors. For 
example, during clinical intakes, practitioners could prompt clients to identify if their worries (if 
diffuse, as with GAD) pertain to community or world affairs (e.g., does the individual become 
activated emotionally and/or physiologically when watching the news), as this is an important 
domain to address and may be a contributing factor to maintenance of distress (Lench et al., 
2018).   
 Towards this aim, mental health professionals could utilize interventions targeted to clients’ 
specific moral concerns. For example, behaviorally restricting media exposure (e.g., watching 
the news, surfing social media sites) could limit the frequency by which clients are subjected to 
PMT, which may reduce distress. In line with this recommendation, Lench et al. (2018) found a 
strong association between media exposure and moral foundations on subjective well-being after 
the 2016 election. That is, their study showed that more media exposure to moral foundations 
inconsistent with participants’ own morals (i.e., individualizing vs. binding) was correlated with 
worse life satisfaction, further evidencing the impact of media attention on mental health.  
In addition to limiting media exposure, clinicians could provide psychoeducation and skills 
training in assertiveness, with the goal of assisting clients to set firm boundaries with people who 
regularly discuss morally evocative content (i.e., family, co-workers, friends). An anecdotal 
example best illustrates this intervention, as one of my past patients presented to treatment with 
emotional reactivity after discussing politics with her siblings. The client noticed an increase in 
her physiological symptoms (e.g., elevated heart rate, sweating, trembling, flushed with heat) 
every time she engaged in these conversations. Through our work together, we explored her 
moral foundations, noted discrepancies between her interpretations of events compared to her 
family members’ perceptions, and reviewed interpersonal effectiveness. Over time, she began to 
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assert limits with her siblings regarding political discussions (e.g., DEARMAN skill; Linehan, 
2015), which appeared to also increase her self-efficacy and improve her mood. By the end of 
treatment, my client had even set a boundary with a co-worker who often shared “passionate” 
opinions about sociopolitical events at their workplace. This case example demonstrates the 
importance of assessing the moral dimension to fully conceptualize clients from a 
biopsychosocial-cultural lens.   
 Additional treatment approaches that may attenuate distress related to perceived moral 
transgressions include cognitive, mindfulness, and coping interventions. Cognitive interventions, 
such as those employed through CBT or Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT) for PTSD (Resick, 
Monson, & Chard, 2008), may be indicated to address rigid, inflexible beliefs and problematic 
patterns of thinking regarding moral situations (e.g., all or none, labeling, overgeneralization, 
magnification, disqualifying the positive, mind reading). Mindfulness-based practices may also 
attenuate distress related to rumination about moral stressors observed in clients’ environment, as 
these exercises focus on intentional present-moment, non-judgmental awareness (Kabat-Zinn, 
1994). Coping strategies, such as diaphragmatic breathing, progressive muscle relaxation, 
engagement with pleasurable activities, or seeking social support, could also target emotion-
driven behaviors elicited from exposure to PMTs (e.g., substance misuse, isolation, avoidance, 
interpersonal conflicts; Barlow et al., 2018). 
 Moreover, this study demonstrates the importance of assessing individuals’ values and 
moral systems in treatment, which is a major aim of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
(ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2011). During the intake and initial phases of treatment, 
mental health providers may benefit from collaboratively identifying clients’ values and 
assessing whether they are living them out in their day-to-day lives. For example, a patient may 
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endorse moral values of fairness and reciprocity but report he/she/they engages in discriminatory 
practices at work (e.g., avoiding Hispanic individuals in a customer service position). 
Highlighting these discrepancies might assist with understanding clients’ distress and targeting 
treatment accordingly. Of note, providers should be mindful to not conflate their clients’ 
moral/value systems with their reported religious affiliation, as these are not always consistent 
(Skitka & Morgan, 2014). Indeed, it is imperative that clinicians, including myself, remain 
vigilant to our own biases and moral imperatives that may interfere with treatment (Jackson, 
Hansen, & Cook-Ly, 2013). In other words, we must know our own stimulus value; to illustrate, 
Weir (2019) asserts that many individuals tend to perceive psychologists as “liberal leaning,” 
which may impact their level of disclosure and the relative strength of the therapeutic alliance 
(Jackson et al., 2013).  
 In addition to treatment considerations, differences in perceived moral transgressions may 
partially explain clients’ interpersonal tendencies and/or relational conflicts. The current study 
lends evidence to this claim, as it suggests PMTs between people uniquely contributes to 
experiences of distress, particularly in those triggered by the socio-political cultural climate. As 
hypothesized, observed PMTs between people (other toward other) were associated with higher 
distress; this finding is consistent with recent research (Tepe & Aydinli-Karakulak, 2019) 
suggesting that relational motivations (i.e., moral judgments based on quality of relationships 
with others) influence the degree of perceived “moral wrongness” of observed acts (Tepe & 
Aydinli-Karakulak, 2019). Moreover, Tepe and Aydinli-Karakulak (2019, p. 326) conducted six 
studies to investigate the role of social context on moral construals; their research showed that 
situations were perceived as “more morally relevant when a relational component was present,” 
compared to content containing harm or impurity transgressions unrelated to social context. 
MORAL TRANSGRESSIONS AND FOUNDATIONS ON DISTRESS  76 
 76 
Therefore, it makes sense that moral transgressions involving others (i.e., focus of most news 
stories) may elicit higher distress than non-relational transgressions. 
 Furthermore, the correlational portion of this study suggests that in-group transgressions 
may be particularly relevant to distress, as in-group was the only PMT that remained significant 
when controlling for all other PMTs in the model. This may suggest that participants valued this 
foundation more than others in evaluating moral situations. This finding maps onto research 
demonstrating how we make sense of our world through the lens of our affiliated groups, 
whether they be based on characteristics of ethnicity, gender, socio-occupational status, 
geographic location, religious beliefs, nationality, or political affiliation (Aronson et al., 2013). 
 When an individual’s in-group is perceived to be threatened, this appears to activate their 
fundamental beliefs about loyalty to their affiliated group (i.e., moral foundation); this 
interaction produces an amplified effect on distress and lends further evidence to the current 
divisiveness of the United States population, particularly the partisan conflicts or “culture wars” 
(Haidt & Graham, 2007, p. 368; Jost et al., 2003; Lench et al., 2018). Towards this aim, Jost et 
al. (2003) conducted a meta-analysis to investigate differences in political ideology and 
motivation between people. Their findings indicated that conservatives tended to endorse higher 
scores on tests of dogmatic thinking, cognitive rigidity, and need for structure and order (in line 
with more binding foundations), whereas liberals tended to have higher tolerance for uncertainty 
and increased cognitive-based reasoning. The researchers argue that membership within a group 
likely influences some of these processes, such as what people attend to or ignore (i.e., motivated 
reasoning, confirmation bias), and how these moral interpretations impact emotional well-being 
within a larger socio-political environment (Jost, 2017).  
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The present study lends support to the current polarized nature of our country and suggests 
that political issues (e.g., gun control, gender inequalities, access to education, economic 
disparities, immigration) may be a salient target of treatment in clinical settings. For example, if 
a client presents to treatment with elevated distress related to the socio-political climate (e.g., 
client heard about sexual misconduct on the news), it may be clinically appropriate to explore 
whether the individuals’ moral values are at play. Therefore, identifying moral foundations and 
perceptions may be useful guides for determining the most appropriate treatment interventions 
(i.e., cognitive restructuring of rigid beliefs, ACT-based cognitive diffusion from thoughts, 
behavioral exercises such as limiting social media exposure to inflammatory transgressions). In 
turn, clinicians can assist clients in identifying ways they can become engaged in the larger 
culture, whether that be political participation, activism/advocacy, building relationships with 
political opponents and gaining different perspectives, or other community involvement (Weir, 
2019). 
  Of note, although individuals endorsed in-group as relevant to their moral interpretations, 
foundations, and emotional experiences in the correlational part of the study, this finding was not 
true when experimentally eliciting distress. That is, in-group/loyalty main effect was the only 
manipulated condition that did not predict changes in baseline distress, whereas exposure to real-
life vignettes depicting harm, lack of fairness, threat toward authority, and impurity produced 
increased distress. One possible explanation for this counterintuitive finding is the idea that 
people may expect that violations to their in-group have caused them the greatest distress (in the 
last two-week period), however this may not be representative of how they actually respond, in 
the moment, when presented with transgressions against their in-group.  
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 Finally, across all experimental PMT, except fairness, transgressions did not interact with 
moral foundations to produce a change in distress. To date, research has focused on the impact of 
perceived harm as the most influential dimension of interpreting moral events (Gray et al., 2014), 
however the current study elucidates the importance of fairness and reciprocity in one’s 
experience of distress. The present findings demonstrate that perceptions of violations to fairness 
may cut across group affiliation to influence distress. To illustrate, some individuals perceive 
restricting gun control laws as a transgression of fairness (e.g., taking away second amendment 
rights), whereas others may argue that lack of gun control is perpetuating discrimination and 
inequality among people. Overall, the current study lends further evidence to the importance of 
assessing individuals’ values and moral systems and may implicate PMT as a public health 
concern relevant to individuals’ emotional well-being (Lench et al., 2018; Weir, 2019).    
Limitations and Future Research 
There are several limitations to this study. First, as there is no existing measure of perceived 
moral transgressions in the literature, I self-developed a measure of PMT that paralleled the 
domains in moral foundations theory (harm, fairness, in-group, authority, purity; Graham et al., 
2011). Although the internal consistency estimates and intercorrelations with transgression 
subscales and other study variables provided preliminary evidence of reliability and validity, 
further research is warranted to determine psychometric properties of these items. In addition, as 
in-group/loyalty was the only PMT that remained significant when all five PMTs were included 
in the model, this indicates a large proportion of shared variance between the various PMT items 
(i.e., across all PMTs). This suggests the need to examine the factor structure of this measure, 
which was briefly investigated via exploratory factor analysis (EFA; see Methods section). 
Results of the PMT measure for the correlational portion indicated a two-component structure. 
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This finding could be due to the study being only moderate in size and representativeness; for 
example, Graham et al. (2011) used a sample of 34, 476 participants to examine the factor 
structure of four versions of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). Further analysis is 
needed to understand the dimensionality of PMTs, which is beyond the scope of the current 
investigation. It is recommended that future studies use a well-validated measure, if one exists in 
the future, to explore this construct; if no measure exists, replicability studies could examine the 
factor-structure and psychometric properties of our PMT measure.  
Furthermore, as the PMT exploratory factor analysis appeared to support a two-factor 
structure (individualizing vs. binding dimensions) consistent with early MFQ literature (Graham 
et al., 2009), it is unclear if there is a meaningful distinction between these two morality 
dimensions, compared to a five-factor model. That is, by assuming a two-factor structure, it is 
possible that importance variance may be discarded. Indeed, Graham and colleagues (2011) re-
examined the factor structure of the MFQ by conducting comparative model fitting of 
confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs); taking fit and parsimony into consideration, the researchers 
found that the five-factor model was consistently “a significant improvement over the 
hierarchical models” (p. 375). Therefore, future studies should examine the best model fit for our 
PMT measure and explore further implications of individualizing versus binding dimensions of 
morality (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007).  
An additional study limitation is the fact that I did not correct for multiple comparisons 
when analyzing the data, which could lead to inflation (i.e., family-wise error rate). As most of 
the results for the main variables under study were significant at p < .001, it is suggested that 
marginally significant results (which were primarily the covariates and one main effect  [purity 
PMT vs. control] analyses in the experimental portion) and those with larger p-values be 
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examined with caution in order to avoid the likelihood of finding an erroneously significant 
effect and/or possibly misinterpreting the results. Thus, it is recommended that future studies 
correct for multiple analyses/comparisons, via adjusted significance levels, by using more 
conservative tests such as the Bonferroni correction or Holm-Bonferroni method (Field, 2013).  
Another major limitation of the present study concerns the generalizability of these findings. 
Specifically, I used a convenience sample gathered through Mechanical Turk (MTurk), which 
has historically caused contention in the empirical literature (Coppock, 2018). For example, 
Chandler and colleagues (2015) found that MTurk participants generally complete dozens of 
academic surveys, which may elicit different approaches to answering items or other demand 
effects. However, a recent meta-analysis using a replication approach of 15 experiments 
conducted through MTurk found a high degree of agreement between these convenience samples 
and national probability samples, suggesting results may not be as biased as originally proposed 
(Coppock, 2018).  
In addition to possible confounds associated with an online convenience sample, most 
participants identified as Caucasian (74.6%), were relatively young (Mage = 36.01; SDage = 11.04; 
cohort effects), and liberal (56%). This threatens ecological validity of our findings, or the ability 
to generalize them to all U.S. residing citizens. This is particularly salient to the current socio-
political climate, as issues of ethnicity, race, and associated negative social attitudes between 
people are emotionally evocative topics. A recent national study conducted by Pew Research 
Center found that approximately 65% of Americans expressed the belief that it has become more 
common for people in society to display “racist or racially insensitive views” (Horowitz, Brown, 
& Cox, 2019). Future research on moral transgressions should consider collecting a more 
nationally diverse and representative participant pool, which may require a larger sample. It is 
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recommended that researchers also control for political affiliation to best understand the effects 
of perceived moral transgressions on distress within the socio-political climate.   
A final limitation of the current study is the influence of contextual factors co-occurring at 
the same time as data collection (July 2018). That is, when this survey was distributed the news 
coverage was primarily focused on issues of immigration reform, which may have affected 
participant responses. It is also possible that participants experienced increased fatigue or carry-
over effects during the experimental portion of the study, which is another threat to external 
validity. Furthermore, I did not control for media exposure, as this could be a possible confound 
or moderator. In the future, this methodical concern should be addressed. Nonetheless, the 
present study does demonstrate that PMT in society are both associated with higher distress and 
cause increased distress in the moment, which was the purpose of this exploratory study.  
Conclusion 
The current study extends the literature by examining the relationship between perceived 
moral transgressions (other towards other) in society (observed in the last two weeks, as well as 
in the moment), moral foundations, and correlates of psychological distress in a sample of U.S. 
residing participants. Specifically, this investigation utilized both correlational and experimental 
designs to examine these constructs between and within participants. In this respect, I found that 
individuals indicated higher distress if they perceived transgressions against their in-group, 
suggesting implications for cultural and political divisiveness and conflict (Graham et al., 2009). 
This relationship became stronger at high levels of endorsement of the corresponding moral 
foundation of loyalty to one’s in-group. Conversely, the experimental manipulation indicated 
that the only PMT*MF interaction that elicits increased distress [from baseline] are those that 
violate moral systems of fairness.  
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Overall, the current study suggests that perceived moral transgressions are a novel 
construct which are correlated with distress and evoke distress in the moment. Moreover, this 
relationship is likely amplified by belief systems based in moral values and intuitions (i.e., moral 
foundations). Of note, this study further illustrates the contribution of perceived moral 
transgressions to distress above and beyond well-known, established risk factors of distress 
(neuroticism, perceived control, avoidance, social support, trauma history), suggesting the moral 
dimension plays a role in emotional well-being. Thus, clinicians should consider exploring this 
domain with clients and identify strategies that can assist in ameliorating their distress, 
specifically in response to socio-cultural stressors observed in their environment. Future research 
is warranted to better elucidate other psychological effects, beyond distress, of perceived moral 
transgressions in the socio-political climate.  
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